

مكتبة قطر الوطنية QATAR NATIONAL LIBRARY

لقد تم إنشاء هذا الملف بنسخة بي دي إف بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/١٠/٩ بواسطة مصادر من الإنترنت كجزء من الأرشيف الرقمي لمكتبة قطر الرقمية. يحتوي السجل على الإنترنت على معلومات إضافية وصور عالية الدقة قابلة للتقريب ومخطوطات. بالإمكان مشاهدتها على الرابط التالي:

archive/81055/vdc 10000000193.0x0001f6/العربية/archive/81055/vdc

المرجع IOR/R/15/1/529

العنوان "الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في

الكويت"

التاريخ/ التواريخ ١٩٣٨ (ميلادي)

لغة الكتابة الاتينية

الحجم والشكل مجلد واحد (١٦٦ ورقة)

المؤسسة المالكة المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

حق النشر غير معروف


حول هذا السجل

يحتوي الملف على سلسلة من ملخصات الاستخبارات الشهرية الصادرة عن الوكيل السياسي البريطاني في الكويت وبعض المراسلات ذات الصلة. تحتوي الملخصات على معلومات تخص الوضع السياسي العام في الكويت والمناطق المجاورة لها، وكذلك أقسام عن الطقس والحركات القبلية والحصار التجاري السعودي المفروض على الكويت وبعض الأخبار عن من قاموا بزيارة الكويت والرياض. وتناقش الملخصات التوترات بين السعودية واليمن بصورة مفصلة.

يحتوي الملف أيضاً على مذكرة عن قبيلة شمر وسلالة ابن رشيد من حائل كتبها جيرالد سمبسون ديجوري، الوكيل السياسي البريطاني في الكويت في يونيو ١٩٣٧ (صص ١٣٨-١٤٥)، ومخططات بيانية تفصيلية كبيرة عن أنساب القبيلة (ص ١٤٧) والسلالة (ص ١٤٩) على التوالي.




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [أمامي] (٣٣٢/١)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [أمامي-داخلي] (٣٣٢/٢)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [i-و] (٣٣٢/٣)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [i-ظ] (٣٣٢/٤)






"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١و] (٣٣٢/٥)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١ظ] (٣٣٢/٦)






"الملف 53/76 155 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١وأ] (٣٣٢/٧)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [اظأ] (٣٣٢/٨)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢و] (٣٣٢/٩)

No. 1665/118/10 HIS Majesty's Minister presents his compliments to The I and has the honour to transmit to help and has the honour to transmit to help I are a second prices. Jedda.	at Jedda Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire. im the under-mentioned documents. BUSHIRE RESIDENCY. AM /24/ Date 2/7 BOHRODITAL RECORDS. 9/6/33. , 198
	ous correspondence :
Name and Date.	of Enclosure. Subject.
Name and Date.	Subject.
Lt.Col.H.R.P.Dickson.C.I.E. Kuwait. 9/6/33. (Copies sent to F.O. under)	Report in Kuwait Intelligence Summary No.81 of 26/4/33 of alleged execution of Somalis at Riyadh. VolD-88 1.228




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢ظ] (٣٣٢/١٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [سو] (٣٣٢/١١)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣] (٣٣٢/١٢)






"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [وو ال ٣٣٢/١٣)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [عُظ الله السياسية الملف 155 53/76)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [• و] (٣٣٢/١ •)

	53/76 4 5
	CONDIDENTIAL. POLITICAL AGENCY,
	No.140. BUSHIRE RESIDENCY. KUWAIT.
1	Dated the 30th June 1935.
	DONFIGENTIAL RECORDS.
	LtColonel H.R.P.Dickson, C.I.E., I.A.,
	Political Agent, Kuwait;
	To
	The Hon'ble the Political Resident
	in the Persian Gulf, BUSHIRE.
	Intelligence Summary for month ending
	70+1 Tune 1077
	ValD-88225
	Sir,
	In continuation of my Confidential Summary No.81,
	dated the 26th April, I have the honour to forward the follow-
	ing items of news dealing with local hinterland and Nejd mat-
	One copy is being sent direct to Jedda by Secret Bag
	via Baghdad and 6 copies to you for distribution.
	I regret that owing to great pressure of work, I
	was unable to submit a "Summary" of news for the month of May.
	I.IRAQ SHEPHERD TRIBES.
	The end of May saw the last of the Iraq shepherd tribes
	return to their homes on the Eupherates. This follows normal
	procedure.
	The shepherds fared very well whilst in Kuwait ter-
	ritory, and sold their wool and ghee in Kuwait at prices which
	they had not realized for some years. This may be put down
	to the exceptionally good grazing which the Winter of 1932-33
	brought its train.
	II. SURVEY OF KUWAIT NEUTRAL ZONE.
	(a) Captain Papworth, R.E., attached to R.A.F. Headquarters
	(58Cs)



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥ط] (٣٣٢/١٦)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦و] (٣٣٢/١٧)


- 2 -

Headquarters Baghdad, who has been engaged on the survey of Kuwait Principality, including the Kuwait Neutral Zone during the Winter and Spring of 1932-33, closed down all survey operations on the 19th May 1933, owing to the advent of the hot weather.

- (b) Captain Papworth in a final report to the Political Agent, before leaving, stated that the only portions remaining to be surveyed were
 - (a) A small strip on the north side of the Bay of Kuwait;
 - (b) The north eastern section of the Neutral Zone.
- (c) Captain Papworth, stated that he hoped to return again in October of 1933, to complete these two portions.
- (d) It may not be out of place here to mention that Captain Papworth worked throughout in two parties, one party under himself dealing with the preliminary work of fixing points etc. etc., while the second party under an assistant followed behind and made the detailed survey.
- (e) Both parties were equipped with field wireless sets, and were provided with permanent excorts and guides by the Shaikh of Kuwait.
- (f) Throughout the period of the survey operations no incidents occurred worthy of mention, except on 8th May 1933, when Captain Papworth, who was camped at Wafrah in the Neutral Zone, received a report from a Kuwait tribesman (who had been maltreated by a Saudiyeh Blockade patrol, south of Arak) that a Saudian raid was contemplated on his camp, from across the border. Nothing, however, eventuated and the report, as indeed the writer thought at the time, turned out to be a canard.
- (g) Captain Papworth and the members of his staff
 made themselves extremely popular with the Shaikh of
 Kuwait and the Bedouin, with whom they came in contact,



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [۴ط] (٣٣٢/١٨)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x000014/لحربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧و] (٣٣٢/١٩)

- 3 -

6.0

contact, and earned golden opinions and praise for the tact and good will which they displayed, wherever they went.


(h) The Shaikh generously expressed his appreciation to the wiriter of the way the survey operations had been carried out and especially presised Captain Papworth. The writer in reply addressed the Shaikh by letter and thanked him for the valuable assistance which had at all times been forthcoming from him and his officials.

III. POLITICAL AGENTS TOUR TO THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF THE NEUTRAL ZONE.

- (a) During May, the writer visited Captain Papworth at Wafrah, and proceeded to in a single car to the southern border of the Neutral Zone, visiting the hills of Hamma, Mutayi, Hafafat, and the wells of Shathaf and Arak on route. He got within a short distance of Aim al Abd, but owing to the bad going and the lack for time was unable to reach that very interesting spot.
- (b) According to Captain Papworth, Ain al Abd, consisted of an evil smelling spring of water rising in a circular basin 15 miles from the sea, and some 10 miles H25D# due east of Arak. The water consisted of H.2.S.(SulphuPated Hydrogen) with very little buoyancy, and flowed in a stream to the sea at the rate of approximately 1000 gallons a minute.
- (c) As a result of Captain Papworth's observations it was ascertained that Arak lay just inside the Neutral Zone border, whilst Ain al Abd lay exactly on the border line. This demolishes the oft made claim of the Nejd authorities that Arak is in Nejd territory.
- (d) Another interesting discovery made as a result of the survey was that the lower end of the shage depression lay 4 to 5 miles further west than as shown on the existing million sheet.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٠)





"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨و] (٣٣٢/٢١)

- 4 -

IV.BIN SAUD AND THE PEARL BANKS OF HASSA

Towards the end of May and early in June persistent rumours were received in Kuwait to the effect that H.M. King Abdul Aziz al Saud was preparing to launch a final economic attack on Kuwait. The method to be employed being as follows:-


- (a) A definite offer would be made to the Shaikh of Kuwait asking that the latter should fall in with certain proposals, to be made by the King for settling the Blockade impasse. The proposal would greatly benefit Nejd and Saudiyeh generally but not Kuwait. The King counted on the active and moral support of several thousands of Nejdis domiciled in Kuwait, who were to bring the necessary pressure on the Shaikh of Kuwait, at the right moment.
- (b) Should the Shaikh of Kuwait reject the King's offer then the Blockade was to be tightened up by the strengthening of the frontier patrols to double and even treble their present strengths, and a wireless station was to be established at Hafar al Batin and perhaps a fired set at Jarriya al Ilya also, expressly with a view to assisting the Blockade staff in their duties. At the same time the King would notify His Majesty's Government and the Shaikh of Kuwait that the Kuwait pearling fleet was to be forbidden to operate on the Hassa Coast within the three mile limit a ban that would gravely disorganize the Kuwait pearlindustry, whose boats from time immemorial had been accustomed to operate on certain banks close in shore in the vicinity of Mishaab and Abu Ali.

COMMENT.

- (a) The above stories, although very persistent, could not properly be termed anything but rumours, so were not reported at the time by the writer, who preferred to await developments.
 - (b) The arrival on the 15th June of the King's letter to the Shaikh, making the startling proposal that he (the Shaikh) should raise hissea customs tariff to that ruling in the Kings dominions, and in return that the King should allow trade with the interior, tribal tribute only being taken, would now seem to give definite support



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٢)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100023551153.0x000018/العربية



"الملف 53/76 155 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [9و] (٣٣٢/٢٣)

- 5 -

8

support to the stories mentioned above.

V.BLOCKADE.

- (a) There have been no incidents worth reporting during May and June except for the persistent rumours mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
- (b) Bin Sauds latest Blockade proposal, which arrived in the form of a very obscurely worded letter to the Shaikh on 15th June, and which is mentioned in comment (b) of paragraph IV above, is interesting. It is certainly the reverse of helpful.


If studied, the offer resolves itself into the following:-

"I have blockaded Kuwait for 10 years, hoping to bring it to its kneels: Kuwait is still alive though very sick. I propose making a last offer to the Shaikh, which if accepted, will mean giving Kuwait either its "coup de grace" or forcing it finally to come under my Political control".

- (c) Two points appear not to have been taken into consideration by the King in putting forward the proposal:-
 - (a) He ignores the fact that the Shaikh and the mercantile community of Kuwait are very shrewd business men and can be counted to see through the trap:
 - (b) He forgets (or pretends to forget) that Kuwait came into being, and has existed for the last hundred or so years solely by virtue of the fact that she, like Bahrain, is a "distributing centre". That she exists and has existed, by her "transit" trade alone with North East Nejd and Qassim, and that to encourage this trade to come in by the Kuwait door she has of set policy maintained her sea customs tariff at the low figure of 4 % (just as Bahrain has).
- (d) Clearly if the Shaikh of Kuwait were to raise his sea customs to that of Bin Sauds Hassa Ports (incidentally his treaty with us forbids this), then Kuwait would at once lose her present advantage over the Saudian ports of Jubail, Qatif and Ojair, where a duty of 70 % to 100 %



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [44] (٣٣٢/٢٤)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠ و] (٣٣٢/٢٥)

- 6 -

9(10)

100 % ad valorem is now imposed on imports (apart from the 25 % transit dues paid to the Government of Bahrain)-

- (d) Shea It should not be forgotten that Kuwait possesses no other means of trade, except this "transit" trade, and her pearl trade. She has no manufactories, no agricultural community and no exports.
- (f) To any one residing in Kuwait and knowing local conditions, a continuance of the existing trade blockade would be far more to the advantage of the Kuwaiti merchant than to fall in with Bin Sauds offer. The merchant under the blockade can at least do some business by running contraband goods into Nejd and Qassim: under Bin Sauds scheme he would simply die.

VI.TRIBAL.

There is little to report under this head.

All tribal groups have, at the time of writing, camped on water, where they will summer. Peace also reigns everywhere.

(a) The Mutair are on the wells of

Hafar,

Safa,

Haba.

Qaraa,

Wabra,

Jarriya.

NOTE. Hamud al Bagaawi, the Kings Blockade Officer has his camp at Jarriya.

(b) The Shammar, those nearest to Kuwait, are scattered round about the Iraq Neutral Zone as follows:-

Um al Ruthumah -- Al Tuwala, under Mishal ibn Twala and Shakhaiyir ibn Tawala.


Uguba -- Al Timiat.

Dulaimiyeh -- Mixed camp.

Al Masari. -- Abda under ibn Shuraim.




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٠ ظ]



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00001c/لحربية/http://www.gdl.ga/الحربية




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١ ١ و] (٣٣٢/٢٧)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١ ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٨)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00001e/لحربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٢ و] (٣٣٢/٢٩)

- 8 -

(12)

would die soon, and then he (Khalid) would come into his own, for "I shall become Shaikh of all the Ajman, and lead them against the Al Saud and war with them till they or I shall be dead" (his words). He, however, expressed affection for Saud al Arafa who was half an Ajman tribesman (his mother being an Ajmiyeh). He was the only one of the house of Al Saud, who was worth anything, he said. We shall invite him to join us and help us in the fight. Khalid returned to his camp with Anaza in the Wadian on 20th June 1933.

VI. VISIT OF SHAIKH OF KUWAIT TO BAHRAIN

The Shaikh of Kuwait accompanied by his cousin

Salman al Hamud and three leading merchants of Kuwait

proceeded by private yacht to Bahrain on 18th June 1933.

He is expected back on 2nd July.

The visit is probably connected with oil, and the Concession, which Bin Saud recently gave to the Standard Oil Group.

The Shaikh before his departure said to the writer that when the King died he (the Shaikh) would certainly lay claim to the whole of North East Hassa as to almost a said to the Mutair and Awazim country ruled over by Shaikh Mubarak). If Bin Saud put any Americans in that area now, he added, he (the Shaikh) would certainly turn them out later. The writer merely reminded the Shaikh about the mistake of counting chickens before they hatched.


I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servent,

> Lt.-Colonel Political Agent, Kuwait,

VSS.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢١ظ] (٣٣٢/٣٠)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x000020/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٣٠] (٣٣٢/٣١)

	53 76	(13)
CO	NFIDENTIAL.	
No.	47/804-S of 1933.	
	de	
	nents to	n the Persian Gulf presents his com-
Ris Th	Majesty's Secretary of Inondon, Najesty's Ambassador, Be e Foreign Secretary to the of India, Similair Officer Commanding, Bagdad,	No. 47. No. 47. No. 47. No. 304-3
	has the honour to transmit to him at t.	a copy of the undermentioned docu-
A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH	British Residency and Consulate-General,	gc 5/7.
De la	BUSHIRE.	Datedath.July1933
	Refe	erence to previous correspondence:
Bu	shire printed letter No.	29/459-S, dated 3rd May 1933
	Description of	
	Name and Date.	Subject.
	7	
Lett	er No. 140, dated 30th	
June 1933, from the Political		Kuwait Intelligence
Agent, K	uwait.	Summary.
	Conv. with con lin	C Paymandas to the Table
Agent,	Kuwait, for information.	s forwarded to the Political




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٣٣] (٣٣٢/٣٢)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤ ١ و] (٣٣٢/٣٣)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٤ظ] (٣٣٢/٣٤)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٥] (٣٣٢/٣٥)

-(2)-



As Suwait (Shaikh Ajenir) is reported to be camped at TAWIL (Kuwait territory)

As Suwait (Shaikh Jadaan) -ditto-at Um Niga, South East of Safwan in Kuwait territory.

Note. There is also a large camp of mixed Shammar (Aslam, Abda, etc.) at Safwan.

II. Blockade.


The Saudi Government early in July started enforcing their latest Customs Tariff as approved by the King in the Persian Gulf region. This works out from 80% ad valorem to 200% according to the nature of goods. The unwisdom of this move with unrest in Najd and everywhere on the increase, ought to have been patent to a child, but the King apparently is determined to take the advice of his amateur financial and customs advisers, such as Abdullah bin Sulaiman and Mohomed al Tawil, etc. The worst feature of these new customs duties is that it taxes out of all reason the peoples food and necessities of life. For instance duty on sugar is now 119%, on rice 40%, and on matches which is as important as actual food to the Najdi and Bedouin, 200%. The immediate result of these ferocious duties has been to greatly increase the already deep hatred and resentment which certainly all over Najd and Hassa and North East Arabia is felt for Bin Saud, and which will certainly be taken advantage of by his Northern neighbours.

The Bedouin everywhere and openly pray for the day when the King will either die, or will smash himself against Yemen or Asir. Bin Saud does not appear to realise that his people who grow nothing and produce nothing (F refer in particular to the Bedouin tribes) are starving: They will not be able to stand the strain much longer. They must either revolt on a large scale or start fighting each other to get food. Bin Saud's subsidies which hitherto have kept the tribes quiet, have either been stopped or been greatly reduced. The secondary result

OI



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٥ ظ] (٣٣٢/٣٦)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٦ و] (٣٣٢/٣٧)

-(3)-


of the new duties has been to give great impetus to the contraband trade into Najd from Kuwait. The same I understand applies in the case of Bahrain also.

In spite of the activities of Ibn Jaloui's frontier patrols, ever increasing numbers of Najd tribesmen, are secretly finding their way into Kuwait, with the deliberate intention of trying to run rice, sugar, tea and other foodstuffs into the interior. They are desperate men, driven on by the haunting knowledge that their families are on the verge of starvation. These blockade breakers tell me (I often have talks with them), that if they lose four contraband cargoes, either through capture, or destruction by their own hand, and get away with a fifth caravan, it will still pay them. Such are the high prices that rule in Bin Saud's dominions.

The following incident which occurred on the 14th July is an example of the desperation to which the Bedouins are being driven, and I fear we have not heard the end of the incident, for Bin Saud's arm is still long, and he seems to delight in revenging himself on his poor subjects these days.

Two small caravans numbering 22 and 21 camels respectively, consisting of Braih tribesmen (Mutair) whose main camp is at Hafar al Batin, left Kuwait on the 11th July. By prearrangement they travelled separately their plan being to meet somewhere in the Dahana and then make for Qasim, after getting through the Blockade ring. The first party reached Shaib al Fao 20 miles south west of Hafar when were pursued and challenged by one of Hamud al Bagaawi's patrols. It being dark a fight ensued, and the caravan guards drove off the patrol by rifle fire. There were no casualties, but the contrabandists knowing the patrol would return with reinforcements and feeling that with their laden camels they could not escape, deliberately unloaded them mercahndise

piled





-(8)of the new duties has been to give great impetus to the contraband trade, into Majd from Nurait. The same I understand applies in the case of Dantein slao. the deliberate intention of trying to run rice, sugar, ers year . roiretni ent otni affutabool reate bus set egadT .noijavrata to egrav edj no era seilimar riedt that if they lose four contraband cargoes, either through with a fifth carevan, it will still pay them. Such are the high prices that rule in Bin Saud's dominions. .ayab easd; stosidus roog ald whose mein comp is at Maran al Batin, left Kuwait on the lith July. By prearrangement they travelled separately their plen being to neet somewhere in the Dahans and then to eno wd begnefished and challenged by one of Hamud al Baggagy's patrols. It being dark a fight ensued, and the cerevan guerds drove off the patrol by rifle fire. There were no casualties, but the contrabandists knowing the patrol would return with reinforcecould not escape, deliberately unlosded thatr mercahudise



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٧] (٣٣٢/٣٩)

-(4)-

16 (17)

piled it up in a heap and set it on fire. They themselves scattered and have not been found yet.

The second party unfortunately and quite accidently ran into the reinforced patrol, a piece of real bad luck, as they were some 25 miles away from the scene of the first incident. Again a fight took place. This time Al Sharaafi al Dausiri, the Commander of Bin Saud's men was killed, and also one of Bin Jaloui's "Murra"-"trackers", who are employed by the Bhockade authorities to "run down" suspected contraband runners. The patrol again beat a retreat and again the merchandise was heaped up and burnt bybthe owners. The contrabandists suffered no loss and dispersed.

It some became known, however, from spies located in Kuwait that the two parties belonged to the Braih, and Al Bagaawi was not slow to strike. He seized 200 camels of the tribe, and threatened Bin Saud's vengence, unless the names of the culprits were given him. This has not been done as yet but a Shamari residing with the tribe has been handed over and made a scape goat of.

On the 18th July Ibn Ashwan, Ali al Shuwairibat and Ibn Jarbua, all leading Shaikhs of the tribe, decided to go to Riath and lay their case before the King. Ali al Shuwaribat and Ibn Jarbua returned after they teached the Dahana, their hearts failting them, and Ibn Ashwan proceeded alone.


Although the incident in our eyes appears small it is of first class importance among the Mutair. Should Braih get no change out of Bin Saud, and fail, to recover their camels, it is on the cards that they will attempt a mass entry into Iraq via Dulaimiyeh, etc.

The above incidents have in no way deterred the many other sportsmen engaged in running the Blockade,

and



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٧ ظ] (٣٣٢/٤٠)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00002a/العربية/archive/81055/vdc



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٨ و] (٣٣٢/٤١)

-(5)-



and the game goes merrily on.

III. Visit of Prominent tribal Personalities to Kuwait.

During the month the following Shaikhs visited the Political Agent.

- (a) Shaaifan Abu Shujara (Ajman) on 12th July 1933.
- (b) Lafi ibn Maalath (Mutair) on 9th July 1933.
- (w) Mutluq as Sur (Mutair) on 25th July 1933.


 All three are refugees in Iraq and receive allowances from King Faisal like Khalid ibn Hathlain (Zeb Sahman).
 - (a) resides with the Dhafir (in Iraq territory) at
 - (b) " with Ibn Hathlain and Naif ibn Humaid, etc and more or less accompany the Amarab (Anaze) in their various movements.
- (c) " on the KinG's personal estates in Baghdad.

 All three Shaikhs are personal friends of mine, and their movements and news are always a source of interest. Lest it be reported in London by Shaikh Hafidh Wahba, Bin Saud's clever representative there, that the presence of these men in Kuwait, pressages something evil, such as a filibustering expedition winto Najd or Hassa, or a rising of the Ajman, etc., as recently was the case when Khalid ibn Hathlain visited Kuwait, I give helow a short sketch of the recent doings of each Shaikh.
- (a) Shaaifan abu Shujara, as stated lives with the Dhafir at present. He went north in June to the vicinity of Aleppo to visit his 3 sons who are in the French Syrian Camel Corps Service (a rather remarkable thing incidentally for members of the Ajman tribe of Hassa to do). His visit to Kuwait was to get a present from the Shaikh (an annual affair "aada") and to see me and other Ajman relations resifting in this town, and of course to gather news for his present master. When I asked why he did not go back to his tribe, he said beacuse of Bin Saud. To use his own words as

nearly



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٨ ظ] (٣٣ ٢/٤٢)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00002c/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩ ١ و] (٣٣ ٢/٤٣)

-(6)-

18 (1)

nearly as possible he said that Bin Saud's word was no longer of any value and even if he swore by God and the Koran no Bedouin would ever trust him again, so black was his treachery during the Akhwan rebellion and after. Bin Jeloui he said was his one friend among the Al Saud, though a hard and stern man, but even Bin Jaloui would not be able to save him from the King these days. He repeated what the whole Bedouinnworld is apparently saying today, that Bin Saud had got into the hands of vertain non Arabians like FUAD Hamza and Jussuf Yassin who were adventurers pure and simple, and that these men had taught the King every deception, deceit and unworthy conduct in dealing with his subjects and in particular had taught him that it was no sin to break your work with a Bedouin.

He laughingly and amusingly summed up the King's character as his tribe saw it today, in the following words.

"Bin Saud is the greatest present giver, and most wonderful person in the whole world to win a man's confidence, if it suited him. At the same time, in treachery, cunning, cruelty and revengefulness he had no equal in all the world. Lastly in playing with foreign nations and their representatives, and especially in making the English nation dance to his tune, he was entirely first class, and unmatcharble in all the world".

Shaikh Shaaifan leftbKuwait for the Dhafir in Iraq on the 20th July.

(b) Laafi ibn Maalath came to Kuwait to see if his tribe had been able to fix up something with the King whereby he could safely return to Najd. His case is rather a sad one and exemplifies the hard methods of Bin Saud with those who have the misfortune to cross him innocently. Six months ago Shaikh Laafi, who at one time was one of Bin Saud's most stalwart and trusty warriors,

was



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [19 ظ] (٣٣٢/٤٤)

after. Bin Jelout he said was his one friend among the Al Saud, though a hard and storn men, but even Bin these days. He repeated what the whole Sedoginaworld the hands of certain non Arabians like FUAD Hanza and Jussul Yasuin who were adventurers pure and kimple, and break your word with a Bedouin. . shrow gaiwefile? odt ni , yabor il was adint aid as net confidence, if it suited him. At the same time, in nd squal in all the world. Leatly in playing with ."blrow ent lis al in Irsq on the 20th July. cently. Six months ago Shaikh Lanii, who at one time

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00002e/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠ و] (٣٣٢/٤٥)

-(7)-

19(20)


was camped in the "Summan" with his family. His brother came into Kuwait to see friends, and on his return was given a bag of rice value Rs. 9/- by Hillal al Mutairi the Pearl Merchant for Shaikh saafi. On the journey he was caught by a blockade patrol who confiscated the rice. The patrol who had been told for whom the bag of rice was intended next/to arrest Laafi. They arrived at his camp and ordered him to accompany them to Bin Jaloui in Hassa. Kaafi's own retainers some 27 in number, thought otherwise and quietly told the patrol to depart in peace, alse they would kill them all. The patrol nothing loath did so and reported events to Hamud al Bagaawi who passed it on to the King. Shaikh Laafi realising that the game was up saddled his camel and all alone sped north and joined the Najd refugees at King Failsal's Court. His family, goods and all he possessed in the world he left behind. Such are the methods whereby good men are turned into outlaws and refugees in the good Kingdom of Saudiyah. His return would of course mean his undoing. Shaikh Laafi returned to Iraq on the 27th July.

(c) Mutliq al Sur. Came to Kuwait to get money out of Hilal al Mutairi his protege and incidentally to give him news of his Trans Jordan visit. He had been sent by King Faisal from Baghdad to Amman with the 4 valuable camels which were bought in Kuwait last April (see para VI of Summary No.81 of 26th April 1933) and which the King decided to present to his brother Abdulla. Mutluq's description of the journey across the desert (he took 25 days), and of the things he saw and heard at Amman were amusing and interesting. He incidentally brought various very cordial messages from for the Shaikh and myself from Amir Abdulla which might have been true or inventions of the wilt Mutluq. They

were



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠٠ ط] (٣٣٢/٤٦)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢١ و] (٣٣ ٢/٤٧)

-(8)-

20(21)

were all verbal. Quite possibly he also brought a secret letter for the Shaikh from the Amir. Shaikh Mutluq returned to Baghdad on the 28th July. Note. It might not be out of place here to mention for the benefit of those who do not know, that there is little that goes on among the North East tribes of Najd and Hassa which does not come to my ears. I spend many hours weekly talking to Bedouin Shaikhs, both high and low, and visiting their tents. Shaikhs, ordinary tribesmen and even the poorest of tribal women know they will find a welcome in my house, and more often than not go away with some small present or other - the ladies usually with a bag of rice or dates. Should there be any trouble brewing over the border I should be the first to know about it, for my visitors keep nothing back. As the cold weather approaches I return the compliment and go and camp with my Bedouin friends of all classes and sometimes for days at a time, not as an Englishman but as one of them.


IV. Najd, Yemen and Asir News.

News from Riath has been obscure and somewhat disturbing during July. Rumours have been persistent that the King intends with the advent of the autumn to undertake some major operation in the direction of Asir and Yemen. From Bedouin sources it is reported that Bin Saud has again started collecting arms, camels and horses in Riath, and on a considerable scale and has instructed Ibn Jaloui in Hassa to "tap" the Awazim tribe for camels. The Awazim supplied nothing during the winter and spring campaign of 1932-1933. It is even said that the tribe as a whole has been ordered to hold itself in readiness to send a large quota of its young men to Asir.

A certain Kuwait merchant writing from Hodeida to the



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢١ ظ] (٣٣٢/٤٨)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٢و] (٣٣٢/٤٩)

21 (23) -(9)the Shaikh on the 8th July said that there were indications everywhere , that fighting would commence with the cold weather between Bin Saud and the Imam Yahya, and that the winter writer had felt it his duty to warn other Kuwait merchants further North to be ready to close down their business at a moment's notice. The same Kuwait subject in a letter written to the Shaikh dated Hodeida the 27th July which arrived by air mail from Karachi gave the following more definite news. Saif al Islam Ahmad with 2,000 (a) Najran. Yemen troops recently attempted to enter Saudi territory to the north west of Najran with the intention of cutting off the steady supply of arms and munitions which were coming to them from Saudi tribes notably the Qahtan. The latter had refused to allow the Imam's troops to cross the border without the express orders of Bin Saud. Saif al Islam Ahmad had explained that he would accept all responsibility but the Cantan were adamant. The tribes of Najran, the writer added, were largely in possession of Saudi rifles bearing the King's name, and which had made the Yemen authorities suspicious. (b) Muiadini | The Al Adrisi has sent a fresh deputation to Sana'a for what and Jizan I purpose was not known. Jizan authorities (Saudi) were busy repairing the old forts which are scattered over the country and were building many new ones. Work was going on hurriedly and much military activity was evident. Some 3,600 men with guns had reached Jizh between 8th and 27th of July. These had been sent down by the Hijaz Government (c) by land and sea. Munitions and foodstuffs were being (a) collected in large quantities at Jizan. The Saudi Government was everywhere (e) reported to be supporting the tribes of Najran openly with arms and ammunition, which had caused deep resentment among the people of Yemen. Heavy fighting was going on there between the Yemen Troops and the Bani Yam tribe The Imam had issued orders for reinforcements of troops to be sent to the Al (f) Mahmiat country. (g) The stricktest censorship was being maintained by the Saudi authorities in Asir and all along the coast. The



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٢ظ] (٣٣٢/٥٠)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x000034/لحربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [77 و] (٣٣٢/٥١)

-(10)-

The Shaikh of Kuwait while very cautious about giving an opinion is inclined to think that the King possibly intends as soon as the weather turns cold to strike down the Tihama at Hodeida, while keeping the Yemen armies occupied in the direction of Najran, where Bin Saud seems to have managed to start a wide conflagration. This seems rather a far fetched view seeing that a hostile Asir would be left in the army's rear. On the other hand Bin Saud may be tempted to risk a southern campaign if only for the sake of diverting the minds of his great tribes from their moody and xx sullen hostility to himself. The King knows that there is nothing like a war with promise of loot to remove dissatisfaction. He would do well, however, not to ask his northern tribesmen to go as far south as Asir again. They simply would not go. They had such a miserable time when they went last winter, what with disease and privation that nothing short of force will make them undertake the long drawn journey again.

A curious rumour reached Kuwait on 31st July that Bin Saud had suddenly gone blind in his second eye and that Dr. Dame from Bahrain had not really gone to attend one of his wives but the King himself.


Obviously this is a canard spread by those who have no liking for His Majesty.

A certain respectable Buraida merchant whose name need not be given arrived in Kuwait at the end of July. Among other things he told the Shaikh that one of the bad times signs of the times and a thing which was offending the Najd world grievously was the growing immorality that was to be observed at the King's Court. He quoted the following two instances which he swore to be true:-

(a)



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [77ظ] (٣٣٢/٥٢)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x000036/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٤ و] (٣٣٢/٥٣)

-(11)-

23 24

- (a) That one of the King's sons had misbehaved himself recently with one of his father's own wives.
- (b) That another son had done the same thing with the King's sister (his aunt).

This cheerful personage also told harrowing tales of how with the introduction of motor convoys from Mecca to Riath, and the wiping away of distances, "Syphilis" had got right among the Central Arabian Bedouins, and was making terrible havoc among them. How far the story is anti-Bin Saud propaganda, I cannot say. There is evidence to show however from the number of cases that come in for treatment that venereal disease is on the increase among the tribes of Najā. I have this on the authority of the Mission Hospital doctors.

V. OIL.

The writer travelled down from Baghdad to Kuwait

(on 3rd August) with Major F. Holmes. The latter
said that the giving of the Hassa Concession to the
Standard Oil Company of California created a serious
situation all round. He accused the American Company
of having "dbuble-crossed" his firm the Eastern and
General Syndicate and the American Mellon group who
were trying to get into Kuwait. He implied that
Mr. Lombardi was the chief culprit.

He said that Bin Saud had received from the Standard Oil a sum of £35,000/- in gold down, and that the latter had promised a large man loan as soon as oil was found.


He gave it as his opinion (but was not certain about this) that Bin Saud had not included the Kuwait Neutral Zone in the Hassa Concession. He admitted that the object of his going to Jedda in the spring was to warn the King not to include the Neutral Zone in any Concession, as his principals had prior claims

and

Show of a sold o




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٤ ظ] (٣٣٢/٥٤)






"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٥٠] (٣٣٢/٥٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٥٦] (٣٣٢/٥٦)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc_100023551153.0x00003a/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100023551153.0x00003a/العربية




"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٦و] (٣٣٢/٥٧)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٦ظ] (٣٣٢/٥٨)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٧و] (٣٣٢/٥٩)

20 (27) 53/76 Confidential. The Political Agency, No. 203. A& Kuwait, the 26th August 1933. From Lieut-Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, C.I.E. Political Agent, Kuwait. The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire. "Kuwait Intelligence Summary for August 1933". Sir, In continuation of my Confidential letter No. 182 dated the 10th August 1953, I have the honour to forward herewith my Intelligence Summary of Kuwait, Najd and Hinterland news for the month of August, together with 5 spare copies. As the situation in Najd is becoming interesting with the daily talk of an impending war between Sau'diyeh and Yemen, I am sending this report a little earlier than usual. I am sending one copy of this directato Jedda. I. Tribal Concentration. Except for the excitement caused among the Northern tribes and in Kuwait, by the frequent reports of an impending war with Yemen, which almost daily come in from Riath and Qasim, and which will be discussed below, there have been no material changes in the Summer Concentrations on water by the various tribes in North-East Arabia. An exception to this has been as under:-Dhafir. Ajemi as Suwait who at the end of July was camped at TAWIL in the southern portion of Kuwait territory, received orders



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٧ظ] (٣٣٢/٦٠)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00003e/العربية/archive/81055/vdc



"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٨٠] (٣٣٢/٦١)

-(2)-

orders from Ibn Jaloui to move out of Kuwait, so that, Zikat could be taken from him by the Saudi Tax gatherers. He accordingly moved on the 8th August south to the wells of Maragha in the Kuwait Neutral Zone with some 40 tents and there paid Zikat to ibn Mansur who met him. Jadaan al Suwait the leading Shaikh of the Dhafir who has been peacefully camped all the summer near Safwan in the North of Kuwait State appears to have also received a similar warning from ibn Jaloui as he also suddenly moved South with some of his people and joined Ajemi at Maragha and like the latter was also "zakied". After paying their Zikat Ajemi is reported to have gone to Riath to complain at his treatment, while Jadaan returned with Ajemis and his own people and camped at the wells of Subaihiyeh, 10 miles inside Kuwait territory. Note (a) Maragha lies east of Shathaf in the Neutral Zone and is a little to the south of the Huzaim region. Note (b). While it was rather to be expected that Ajemi would be called upon to pay the annual tax to Bin Saud, seeing that for several years he has thrown in his lot with the King, the move south of Jadaan and his complacently paying Zikat to ibn Mansur is rather surprising, for as far as one is aware, he still is an Iraq subject, and owes allegiance to that State. Unfortunately Jadaan was always a person who liked to play hide and seek with both Iraq and Bin Saud, and as I told him last year, such tactics would eventually lead

II. BLOCKADE.

him into trouble, for they would deceive not one.

(a) On page 4 of my Summary for July and 3rd paragraph, I stated that Ibn Ashwan alone proceeded to Riath to explain the case of the killing of the King's Officer Al Sharaafi al Dausiri in the fight between the caravan convoy and the Baockade Patrol on the 14th July. It appears from later evidence that Ali al Shuwairibat and

Ibn

(28)



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٨ ظ] (٣٣٢/٦٢)

-(S)orders from Ibn Jalout to move out of Kuwait, so that, Zikat could be taken from him by the Saudi Tax gatherers. He accordingly moved on the 8th August south to the emos Atiw enog lertus Newty the Kuwait Newtral Cone with some 40 tents and there paid Siket to ibn Maneur who met him. Jadaan al Suwait the leading Shaikh of the Dhafir who has end ni newled reen remmus out the beginso yllufecaeq need Morth of Kuwait State appears to have also received a similar warning from ibn Jaloui as he also suddenly moved South with some of his people and joined Ajem at Maragha and like the latter was also "zakied". After paying their Zikat Ajemi is reported to have gone to Riath to complain at his treatment, while Jadaen returned with Ajemis and his own people and camped at the wells of Substitues tiskus ebiant selim Of , deviliery. Meragia lies east of Shathaf in the Weutral one and is a little to the south of the Huzaim region. Mote (b). While it was rather to be expected that Ajemi would be called upon to pay the annual tax to Bin Saud. seeing that for several years he has thrown in his lot with the King, the move south of Jedean and his complacently paying Zikat to ibn Mansur is rather surprising, for as far as one is aware, he still is an Iraq subject, and owes allegiance to that State. Unfortunately Jadaan was always a person who liked to play hide and seek with both Iraq and Bin Saud, and as I told him last year, such tactics would eventually lead .eno-on evisceb bluow year not , elduort otal mid II. BLOCKADE. (a) On page 4 of my Summary for July and 3rd perscraph, I stated that Ibn Ashwan alone proceeded to Riath to explain the case of the killing of the King's Officer Al Shereaft al Dausiri in the fight between the carevan onvoy and the Bacckade Patrol on the 14th July. It appears from later evidence that Ali al Shuwairibat and



"الملف 53/76 155 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٩٩] (٣٣٢/٦٣)

-(3)-

24 29

Ibn Jarbua did not turn back as reported, but went with Ibn Ashwan to see the King.


(b) I mentioned in the last para but one (page 4) of
Note II on the Blockade, (July Summary) that the shooting
of al Sharaafi was of first class importance in the eyes
of the Mutair, and might easily result in the moving
en masse of the Brain tribe into Iraq if a flase step
were made. Apparently the King's Blockade Officer al
Bagaawi and the King himself thought likewise, as may
be seen from the following sequel to the incident.

Ibn Jaloui on hearing the news of the contraband affair and the resulting engagement, at once sent a party of 36 men under Fulaiyih al Attaibi to reimpers reinforce Al Bagaawits Blockade Contingent, with orders that Al Bagaawi should punish the Braih without delay. Al Bagaawi refused to carry out the orders, on the plea that the Brain were excited and in a bad mood and any undue pressure would send them hot foot over the frontier into Iraq. Hamud al Bagaawi wrote to Ibn Jaloui and explained his reasons for not taking action and put the matter clearly before him. Bin Jaloui agreed that he Al Bagaawi need not accompany the punitive expedition but ordered that Fulaiyih the Attaibi should act alone. The latter accordingly moved to Hafar, but before reaching that place, he received peremptory orders from Al Shuwaish the King's Official in Charge of the Royal Camel Herds at Hafar al Atz to hold his hand; this was followed immediately by a letter from Bin Saud himself ordering no action, as Ibn Ashwan, Ali al Shuwairibat and Ibn Jarbuh, the Braih leading Shaikhs, were in Riath and had explained everything satisfactorily.

Comment. From the above it is clear that the King thought the time inopportune for punishing the Braih, as this would upset the Mutair generally, just when he was about to launch a campaign in the South. The Bedouin



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٩ ظ] (٣٣٢/٦٤)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x000042/العربية/http://www.qdl.qa/العربية



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠] (٣٣٢/٦٥)

-(4)-



Bedouin world round about Kuwait have certainly interpreted the incident in this way.

(c) & large number of Shammar tribesmen operating in eight and tens came up to Kuwait from the Iraq Neutral Zone (Dulaimiyeh, etc) between the 12th and 20th August and bought up considerable supplies. Clearly this was for contraband purposes into Najd, and indicated a general relaxation of authority (perhaps of set purpose) on the frontier, west of Hafar al Batin and on the routes leading from the Neutral Zone to Qasim. The men were from the Abda and Aslam sections and their operations seemed to indicate an attempt on the part of Bin Saud's officials to keep these northern border tribes in good humour by winking the official eye at their contraband operations.


III. Collection of Zikat.

- (a) The taking of this annual camel and sheep tax by Bin Jaloui from the Hassa tribes including the Mutair, was as usual entrusted to Abdullah al Mansur.
- (b) During July this official slowly moved north and took the tax from the Ajman, Bani Hajir, Bani Khalid and other tribes of Hassa.
- (c) Early in August he arrived at Ark in the Kuwait Neutral Zone, and "Zakied" the Awazim who were onmped on the Wafra and Ark wells.
- (d) On the 18th August he proceeded to Hafar al Batin and collected the tax from the Brain section of Mutair while a second party of his collected the tax from Mutair Ilwa, camped over the Summan region.
- (e) The collection of this tax as far as Hassa and the Summan tribes were concerned was carried out tactfully and without any trouble.
- (f) The taking of Zikat by Abdullah al Mansur from Ajemi al Suwait and Jadaan al Suwait, heads of the Dhafir (an Iraq tribe) has been described in para I

above.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣٠/٦٦)





"الملف 53/76 53/76) [ا (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠] (٣٣ /٦٧)

-(5)-

above. Shaikh Hantush al Suwait, whomis camped near Safwan (north Kuwait) apparently refused to go South and pay the tax, and according to his statement made to me on the 19th August, he had retained in his hand the major portion of the Dhafir and prevented them accompanying Jaddan.

None of the Al Samidda nor the Bani Hussain, both sections of the Dhafir camped on the Hamar Lake and Sagwan respectively made any attempt to pay Zikat to Bin Saud nor as far as I know have any of the other sections of the Dhafir further West done so.

(g) The Shaikh of Kuwait completed the taking of Zakit from his own tribal people al Jahara, Tawil, Subaihiyeh and Wara before the 15th August.


IV. Anti Assyrian Pamphlets.

- (a) On the 14th August, anti-Assyrian pamphlets appeared in the Kuwait bazaars which obviously emanated from Iraq. These pamphlets were anti-English in character, and accused His Majesty's Government of stirring up the Assyrians to defy the Iraq Government, and generally behave as they had done, with the object of maintaining a sort of behind the scenes control over Iraq. Part of the pamphlet was also in the nature of anti-Christian propaganda, and clearly was intended to inflame the minds of Moslems against Christians. The Assyrians were made out to have tortured, maimed and cut of sundry limbs of wounded Iraq soldiers.
- (b) The pamphlet was I believe widely read but had little effect on the stolid Kuwaiti who with his long contact with India, can be trusted to size up a situation sensibly and calmly.
- (c) There was a mysterious withdrawal of the offending sheets almost as soon as they came out and I suspected the Shaikh's hand in this, although I made no mention of the matter to him.

(d)



"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣١] (٣٣٢/٦٨)





"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣] (٣٣٢/٦٩)

-(6)-



(d) The Shaikh with his well known pro-British sympathies can always be counted to act vigorously and sensibly in such matters and controls his people well, where such effusions are concerned.

V. Riath News and War Rumours.

(a) Throughout August there have been continuous rumours of impending operations on the part of Bin Saud in the direction of Nejran or Asir. (See also para IV of my summary for July). Most of these have been brought in by tribesmen, and must of course be taken at their proper worth.


From the mass of evidence that has come to hand, one thing stands out fairly clearly. It is that the tribes everywhere especially in the North have no stomach at all for such distant operations as Nejran and Asir, andwill largely refuse to obey any call to arms, where they think they can safely do so. This especially applies to the great tribe of Ataiba, and to the Mutair, Ajman and Awazim in the North East. It is also clear that there have already been many such calls, but only refusals and excuses have resulted. The Brain and Bani Abdulla (Mutair) and the Ataiba generally suffered greatly in the Asir operations of last year, and it will take more than the King's silver tongue to persuade them to follow his standrad in any distant operation. The Ajman tribe might be persuaded to send large contingents to Nejran as both they and the Murra are related to the Beni Yam tribe, and will always go to their help. Against this is the Ajman's permanent distrust of Bin Sama, and the hope they have that operations in the far South will be the downfall of their "Great King".

(b) The following news was given to the writer by an important Shaikh of the Mutair, who arrived in Kuwait from Riath on the 10th August. He is one of the most "Loyal" of Bin Saud's Shaikhs, and as his having met me and imparted the information would get him into trouble

MIXEDRATIVE



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣١/ ، ٢٣٣]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣] (٣٣٢/٧١)

32 33

-(7)-

trouble at once I prefer therefore to keep his name dark.

- (i) There had been a little trouble at Tabuk, and the local Amir had asked Bin Saud for reinforcements or to accept his resignation. The informant did not know the nature of the trouble, but believed that the Governor's resignation had been accepted, and another Governor appointed.
- (ii) Asir. There were 26 forts garrisoned by Sau'di troops, built or nearing completion in Asir. Ten of these had garrsons of 100 men each and 16 had only 50 men each. Turki al Sudairi, new Governor of Ebha had asked for 800 men to bring up the strength of the 16 forts to 100 men each. The King through Amir Faisal had agreed and ordered Qabtan to supply 250 men, Ataiba 200, Total 450 the balance of 350 being provided from Town Legvies. All had been sent to Ebha and onwards in lorries etc.
- (iii) No operations were contemplated in the direction of Asir as far as the informant knew.
 - (iv) Hamad bin Shuwaiyir had been appointed Governor of Jizan and Sabiya under Ebha's jurisdiction.
 - (v) Nejram. The whole Wadi al Nejran was in the hands of Yemen troops except the town of Badr, but as the King was maintaining a close censorship he the informer could give no further news.
- (vi) <u>Hassa</u>. Bin Saud had forbidden the export of dates from Hassa and Qatif.
- (vii) All Najd tribal Shaikhs who had been forbidden to come to Riath till the end of August, had been ordered to attend by the 15th August.
- (viii) Except for temporary excitement in Mutair country over the caravan incident and the killing of Bin Saud's official, and the taking of Zikat everywhere, things were quiet in Hassa and in the Mutair country.
 - (ix) He the informant had heard after leaving Right that Bin Saud had ordered Naif bin Hathlain, Ibn Humaid, and Ibn Lamir to be sent to Hoffuf. This at Ibn Jaloui's request. He did not however believe the news to be true.


Comment. It should not be forgotten that the informant is a staunch pro Bin Saud supporter. Hence his guarded information.

- (c) The following news was supplied to me by the Shaikh of Kuwait on the 16th August. It came from Ajman sources to Navar al Mutalaqim a chieftain in Kuwait employ and was confirmed from Mutair sources in Artawiyeh.
 - (i) The nws that the Riath prisoners had been sent to Hoffuf was untrue.

(ii)




"الملف 53/76 53/76) II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣ظ] (٣٣٢/٧٢)






"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٤] (٣٣٢/٧٣)





"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣٢/٧٤)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٥] (٣٣٢/٧٥)

34 35)

-(9)-

to rouse his people to some form of enthusiasm for war, but with little success.

The Shaikh of Kuwait's views were that Bin Saud would like to fight Yemen if he could but that owing to wide-spread discontent and unrest among his tribes especially those along his northern frontiers, he dare not risk a campaign.

That Bin Saud by his stupid policy of the last 3 years, had thoroughly estranged the Mutair, Ajman and Ataiba (he especially referred to the long imprisonment of their chieftains in Riath).

Thatbthe prevention of his starving North-Eastern tribes from buying supplies from Kuwait, had long ago turned what loyalty they originally felt for the King into bitter hatred: that King Faisal and the Amir Abdullah in the last two years had not been slow to take advantage of the estrangement of these northern tribes and had got them more or less to promise to revolt, by means of Agents

and ∠ spies who had long been sowing the seeds of disloyalty among them, should Bin Saud get entangled in distant operations to the South.

That it was significant that several great chieftains from Najd, notably

Naif ibn Humaid Khalid bin Hathlain Al Damir

(Ataiba) Ajman

Ibn Uthain

Laafi ibn Muallath Mutluq as Sur

Mutair


were all on King Kairs Faisal's side and in receipt of subsidies. These men were never idle.

VI. GENERAL.

(a) Shaikh Hautush as Suwait (Dhadir) called on me on the 19th August 1933, and presented me with a riding camel which was returned. He had been to see Captain Glubb at Al Asraq and brought back interesting news from those parts. He was given a suitable present and sent to his people near Safwan.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣٠/ ٦٠]



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00004e/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠] (٣٣٢/٧٧)

35 (36) -(10)-(b) Mansur al Saud (Ajman) in the service of King Faisal and till 5 months ago (according to him) working under Captain Glubb in Transjordania arrived in Kuwait on the 24th August 1933 and called on me. He insisted that he had come to marry a wife and return to his chief Ibn Hathlain. Doubtless he was sent to spy out the land, and bring news of Bin Saud's contemplated "War". I gave him an "Abbah" as present and sent him away. (c) Anaizan ibn Munaikhir, who came to Kuwait with Ibn Hathlain, and remained behind at Jahara to marry a wife (the divorced/lady of the Shaikh ofKuwait) is still honeymooning at Jahraa. He is a nice boy, and though his father is high in Bin Saud's favour in Riath, he the son dare not return to Najd. Another instance of the Bedouin keeping a foot in both camps, no doubt. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, Har Dicem Lt-Colonel, Political Agent, Kuwait.




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣ ظ] (٣٣ ٢/٧٨)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x000050/لحربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية




"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٧]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣٠/٨٠)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100023551153.0x000052/العربية




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣٠/ ٣٣)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣٨] (٣٣٢/٨٢)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100023551153.0x000054/




"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٩] (٣٣٢/٨٣)





"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣٠] (٣٣٢/٨٤)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x000056/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٠] (٣٣٢/٨٥)

3940

- 2 -

many meetings came to the conclusion that it were better to obey the King's and Ibn Jalaoui's orders than to hang back and risk the King's displeasure and punishment.

(d) Their line of argument has been typical and curious to follow and has taken the following line:-


"Either (i) the King intended to fall upon and punish some big tribe like Ataiba which had not been too loyal during the last year, or (ii) he desired to make a test mobilization of his forces to find out who were really loyal among subjects, or (iii) he planned to go to the assistance of Nejran which had been overrun by the Imam Yahya's armies."

They saw money and loot in (1) and (11) and disaster in (111) It were better, however to risk disaster than the King's anger, for his arm was long and he never forgot. So contingents must be sent.

- (e) In other words a mixture of curiosity, cupidity and fear decided them to obey the call to "ghazzi" and send their contingents, to the places of concentration decided upon.
 - (f) These have been fixed as follows:-
 - (a) Al Juda and Nejbiyeh (45 miles N.W of Hofuf) for the Hassa tribes including Mutair (Ilwa and Wasil).
 - (b) Riath and Kharj district (30 miles S.E. of Riath) for the Gassim, Arid Washam town contingents, as well as the tribal groups of Harb, Sbei, Sahool Mutair (Bani Abdilla) and others.
- (g) The 11th September (al Nus) was, as far as one can gather, fixed upon as the date when all contingents should be ready concentrated at the above two rendezvous. The 26th September (New Moon) was given out by the King as the date on which his armies would march.
 - (h) The following Hassa tribes have definitely been ascertained



"الملف 53/76 53/76) [الستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٠٠] (٣٣٢/٨٦)





"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠ و] (٣٣٢/٨٧)

40(4)

- 3 -

ascertained to have sent contingents to Al Juda and Nejbiyeh inspite of having, throughout August, tried their utmost to get out of doing so, on one excuse or another. In every case almost, contingents were not up to the strength demanded

1. Awazim,

2. Ajman, 3. Mutair, (Ilwa and Wasil).

5. Bani Hajir,

6. Manasir, 7. Murra.

- (i) Of the above the Awazim and Mutair were those who tried hardest and longest to avoid obeying the King's orders.
- (j) In every case non-combatants etc., have remained camped on the various wells where they have been throughout the summer except the Awazim who show a tendency to close up to and concentrate in the Kuwait Neutral Zone.

(k) DHAFIR.

In paragraph I of Kuwait Summary No.203 of 26th August, I mentioned that Ajemi as-Suwait was reported to have gone to Riath to see the King, and that Jadaan as-Suwait after being "zakied" returned from Maragha and camped at Subaihiyeh. Actually

- (a) Ajemi as-Suwait left for Riath on 19th September and is still there;
- (b) Jadaan as-Suwait left for Riath on 4th September with his nephew Mirwi al Suwait and was seen there as late as 15th September.

Before he left Jadaan moved his camp (& dozen tents only) to Tawil and joined up with Ajemi's people.


HANTUSH AS-SUWAIT, was reported on the 16th September to have moved North West into 'Iraq from Um Niga (Kuwait territory) because of the contraband activities of some of his people, which he feared would get him into trouble with

the Iraq/

10.26



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤١] (٣٣٢/٨٨)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00005a/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٤و] (٣٣٢/٨٩)

- 4 -

41 (43)

the 'Iraq authorities.

(1) ATAIBA.

Excused from furnishing any war contingent probably because Bin Saud felt it would be unwise to try and compel it to do so. Ibn Rabaiyan, their leader, after holding out for a considerable period against the King's order to go to Riath and see him, eventually was persuaded to repair to the capital throught he Agency of certain friendly Shaikhs. He took care to send 11 mares asked of him to appease the wrath of the King as well as three ladies of his family to act as spokesmen for him. The King to his surprise, no doubt, received him well, loaded him with presents and informed him that both he and his Ataiba, as well as others who had taken part in the Asir operations last year need not provide any war contingents for his coming campaign. See paragraph V(d) iv of Summary for August.

(m) HARB. 6-33

Al Firm, the paramount Shaikh of this tribe, after having assisted in bringing the sulking Ibn Rabaiyan of the Ataiba to his senses and persuading him to go to Riath, when he appeared likely to refuse to do so, himself started giving trouble. He pleaded by letter, that it was necessary to guard the Northern marches of Saudiyeh for the King, and that he was too old a man to be asked to go and fight Nejran or Asir way. The King was firm and replied that his day of need had come, when every loyal man must stand by him. He insisted on his sending the necessary war contingent, seeing that his tribe had not gone to Asir in 1932. As regards guarding his northern frontier, the King explained he that Ibn Musgod of Hail was quite capable of doing this and had been allotted the Task. The tribe has complied with the King's call.

II./



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٤ ظ] (٣٣٢/٩٠)

the 'Iraq authorities. (I) ATTATAA Bin Saud felt it would be unwise to try and compel it to do so. Ibn Rabaiyan, their leader, after holding out for a considerable period against the Ling's order to go to Risth and see him, eventually was persuaded to repair to the capital throught he Agency of certain friendly Shaikhs. He took oare to send Il mares asked of him to appeare the wrath of the King as well as three ladies of his femily to act he spokesmen for him. The King to his supprise, no doubt, received him well, loaded him with presents and turormed bim that both he and his Ataiba, as well as others ton been usey takl anottanego wish edt ul trag medet bad odw provide any war contingents for his coming compaign. See paragraph V(d) iv of Summary for August. (m) HARB. Al Firm, the paramount Shaikh of this tribe, after having assisted in bringing the sulking Ibn Rabsiyan of the Atath of og of mid gnibsusred bue seenes ald of adiath, when he appeared likely to refuse to do so, himself started giving trouble. He pleaded by letter, that it was necessary to suard the Worthern marches of Saudiyeh for the King, and that he was too old a man to be asked to go and fight Mejren or Asir way. The King was firm and replied teum nem fayof yaeve nedw , emos bad been to yeb sid tedt stand by him. He insisted on his sending the necessary war contingent, seeing that his tribe had not gone to Asir in 1932. As regards guarding his northern frontier, the King explained h that Ibn Museod of Hail was quite capable edint edl . wast end bestolfs need had bue sid autob to . Ifso a'anil ont the beligmos aen \.II

اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00005c/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٤] (٣٣٢/٩١)



- 5 -

II.RIATH NEWS AND WAR RUMOURS.

- (a) These have been so may and frequent throughout September, that I have decided to give a summary of the news as given me by the more reliable of my informants, rather than attempt, in any way to sift the immense volume of rumour and gossip, that has come in almost daily from Riath, Qassim and Bedouin sources.
- (b) The following was supplied by His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait on 6th September 1933:
 - (i) Kuwait bazaar rumour had it that Bin Saud had ordered 50,000 bags of rice from India to go direct to Ras Tanura near Qatif, and tenders were already being asked for from dhow owners for the transportation of this consignment from Ras Tanura to Ojair.

 Rs.25/- per 100 bags had already been offered.


COMMENTS. No doubt the Political Agent, Bahrain is in possession of the correct facts.

- (ii) He confirmed the news that the export of dates from Hassa had been forbidden by the King.
- (iii) The 2000 men sent by Ibn Saud down the Wadi Dawasir in August which he (the Shaikh)had said, had been recalled, had merely been ordered to hold fast, they had not been withdrawn. (See para V(d)(iii) of my August Summary).
- (c) The following news was supplied on 10th September by a minor Shaikh of the Mahfuth section of the Ajman, who resides in Kuwait territory. He had left Riath on 24th August.
 - (i) The Hassa tribes were concentrating their fighting forces in the Al Juda area at Nejbiyeh under the direction of Ibn Jaloui. Both places were north west of Hoffuf and water and grazing were plentiful.
 - (ii) The force so collected was to be under the command of Saud, Ibn Jaloui's son.
 - (iii) The place for the concentration had been selected for its proximity to Hoffuf, whence dates, rice and supplies generally could be easily transported to them.

(iv)/



"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٤٣] (٣٣٢/٩٢)



اعرض على مكتبة قطر الرقمية: archive/81055/vdc 100023551153.0x00005e/العربية/http://www.gdl.ga/العربية




"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٤ و] (٣٣٢/٩٣)

(44) - 6 -(iv) Riath gossip was that Nejran was to be the King's objective. (v) He had heard the King in open Mejliss say that Yemen forces had overrun the whole of Nejran and were in complete occupation of the valley. Several Nejran Shaikhs had arrived at Bin Sauds court, notably Ibn Mana, to beg for help against the Imam Yahya. He had heard in Riath that Ibn Rabaiyan (Ataiba), Al Firm (Harb) and Mashari ibn Musaiyis (Mutair) were all trying to get out of sending war contingents to the capital, and that the King was anxious lest their chiefs should suddenly defy him, and make his task of mobilization difficult. (vii) He had returned from Riath via Hoffuf and the coast, and # saw contingents of Ajman Bani Hajir, and Awazim everywhere moving south to Al Juda. (viii) He noticed that Awazim non-combatants with women and children were moving into the Kuwait neutral Zone. These, he thought, were planning to come up to Kuwait for suplies, taking advantage of the partial disorganization that had occurred in the Blockade arrangements as a result of war rumours. (d) The following was given me by a reliable Shaikh of the Jiblan section of the Mutair on 15th September:-Faisal bin Aun of Medina had sent to Riath 20 herds (Assas) of 30 camels each. Faisal bin Sulaiman of Taif had sent to Riath 15 Assas of 50 camels each. (ii) He confirmed story that ibn Rabaiyan had arrived at Riath with eleven mares and two ladies, and that the King had forgiven him publicly for having refused to attend when first summoned and had further excused (iii) Ataiba from sending a war contingent. Al Firm, Shaikh of Harb had written in to say that he was prepared to go and fight to-wards the north, east or west, but could not go south as he was no longer a young man, but that the King had refused to excuse Ibn Musaad, Governor of Hail, had been informed by the King that Hail and Shammar need not supply any contingents. Their (V) role was to watch the north and west. The Mutair (Ilwa) chiefs, Ibn Shuqair and Ibn Maziad, had been to Riath early in September to excuse themselves for their (vi) inability to bring men, but without success.



"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٤٤] (٣٣٢/٩٤)





"الملف 53/76 53/76) [ا (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٤ و] (٣٣٢/٩٥)

44 (9)

- 7 -

(e) The following was brought me on the 19th September by a reliable Kuwaiti of Mutair origin. He reached Kuwait on 24th September from Riath after visiting Buraida, Anaiza, Zilfi, Majmaa, Artawiyeh.


- (a) All towns of Qassim including all "hayars" i.e. Akhwam settlements, had sent their contingents to Riath.
- (b) All persons who had gone on "ghazzu" to Asir last year were by Royal decree excused this year.
- (c) Among those excused were Ibn Musaad, Governor of Hail, Ibn Rabaiyan and whole of Ataiba, and Mashari ibn Musaiyis, Shaikh of Artawiyeh.
- (d) Al Mutair (Ilwa and Wasil) including the following well known Shaikhs: Ibn Shuqair, al Fuqum, Ibn Lanir, Ibn Shiblan, Ibn Jarbuh, Ibn Shuwairibat and Ibn Ashwam, had after much wavering moved to Al Juda with their respective fighting men.
- (e) Al Harb had also marched inspite of many lementations on the part of their chief, Al Firm.
- (f) The Al Juda force was under orders of Ibn Jaloui's son, while the Riath concentration was under orders of Saud bin Abdul Aziz.
- (g) The King had intimated that he would himself take supreme command.
- (h) The King's objective was definitely now Nejran, not Asir, and the route would be via Solaiyil Dam, Bisha and Tathlith.
- (i) The Imam Yahya had sent a formal declaration of war "Rad al Niga" to Bin Saud saying, "Beware, my son, Saif al Islam is proceeding to invade your country". Bin Saud is said to have replied with the laconic message, "He is welcome, I have also a son, who will meet him, and give him his deserts".

(f)1.0n 27th September His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait in-Ku informed me that one of his trusty Ajman messengers had just returned from Riath (25.9.33). He had actually dined with ibn Mana, Shaikh of the Nejran tribes (Yam), who was a refugee with Bin Saud. Ibn Mana had told him that he had recently sent back to Nejran 4 of his men by the King's orders to bring news of the strength of the Yemen forces. That they had been captured and made to confess their errand: upon which Saif al Islam had ordered them to be taken round and shown everything possible, and then sent back to Bin Saud to tell the latter

what/



"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٤ ظ] (٣٣٢/٩٦)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٠] (٣٣٢/٩٧)

- 8 -



what they had seen.

(ii) The same informant brought the report that the King had given out that he would himself shortly motor down to Al Juda and inspect the force concentrated there.

(iii) The Shaikh opined that Bin Saud would not go to war even yet, as such would be too dangerous for him. All the talk of war etc. etc. was so much bluff he thought, and the King would leave himself a loophole as a "face saver".


COMMENT. I am inclined to agree with the view.

III.BLOCKADE.


- (a) Nothing of importance to report under this head.
- (b) Apparently as a result of the caravan incident near Hafar al Batin of 14th July, where Al Sharaafi al Dausiri, Bin Saud's official was killed by blockade runners, (see para II of my Summary for July last, No.182, dated 10th August), news reached the King early in September that 16 small convoys had got through to Anaiza, from Kuwait He occordingly sent an armed party from Riath to demand of Ibn Sulain, the headman of Anaiza, the actual 16 caravans. The story was of course denied whereupon the King ordered the arrest of 16 leading citizens, who were later made to pay a fine of Rials 200 each. The story has not been confirmed, so it must be taken for what it is worth.

IV. CIL.

- (a) On one or two occasions lately His Excellency when discussing the Hassa Oil Concession recently given to the Standard Oil Company, has been strangely <u>definite</u> in his assertion that the King had not included the Kuwait Neutral Zone in the concession.
- (b) In referring to the Shaikh of Qatar's visit to Riath on 25th August, the Shaikh gave it as his opinion that the Shaikh of Qatar, who was under the thumb of Bin Saud, might easily be persuaded to try and cancel his



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٠٦] (٣٣٢/٩٨)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧٤و] (٣٣٢/٩٩)

u6 47

- 9 -

his agreement with the Anglo Persian Oil Company, at the behest of the King.

He further gave it as his opinion that actually the journey to Riath was not connected with Oil, but with the loan of £10,000, which the Shaikh of Qatar had made to Bin Saud sometime back. He had heard that the Shaikh of Qatar had stupidly reminded the King about repayment and this had greatly angered that monarch. Abdulla ibn Jaloui, his friend, had then secretly instructed the Shaikh of Qatar to come and make his peace, promising himself to act as go-between.

COMMENT.

No doubt the Political Agent, Bahrain has full details of the matter.

V.BASSIDU INCIDENT AND VISIT OF BRITISH DESTROYER FLOTILIA TO THE PERSIAN GULF.


- (a) The news that His Majesty's Government had decided to make a Naval demonstration in the Gulf was received with the greatest rejoicing and relief not only in Kuwait but, I am told, in Basra, and all down the Arab Coast.
- (b) Every one at once appreciated that the Bassidu incident was the cause, and great has been the gossip since.
- (c) While some regret was expressed to the writer, by both Shaikh and leading citizens of Kuwait that His Majesty's Government had not insisted on
 - (i) the dismissal of the Persian Captain who had hauled down the British flag
 - (ii) the formal hoisting again of the Union Jack by the Persians in presence of Persian and British Naval guards of honour.

The general attitude of His Majesty's Government has been most favourably commented on.

(d) The hope is now generally expressed that the




"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٤ الملف 73/١٠٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٤و] "الملف 7/١٠١)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٤٨]) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٤و] (٣٣٢/١٠٣)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩ ٤ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠٠] (٣٣٢/١٠٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠٠] (٣٣٢/١٠٦)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠] "الملف 7/١٠٠٥)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠١] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٥و] (٣٣٢/١٠٩)

POLITICAL AGENCY. No.262. Dated the 30th October 1933. From Lt.-Colonel H.R.P.Dickson, C.I.E. I.A., BUSHIRE REBIDENCY. Political Agent, Kuwait; Dall 7.11. 33. To The Hon'ble the Political Resident CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS. in the Persian Gulf, BUSHIRE. Kuwait Intelligence Summary for October 1933. Sir, In continuation of my confidential No.230, dated the 29th September 1933, I have the honour to forward my Intelligence Summary of Kuwait, Nejd and hinterland news for the month of October, together with 4 spare copies. I am sending one copy of this each to Jedda and Bahrain direct. I. TRIBAL. (a) GENERAL. All Desert gossip continues to centre round Bin Saud's expedition to the Yemen, and no one even yet seems to know for certain whether Najran or the region round Jizan and Sabiya (Asir Coastal region) is the King's ultimate objective. There seems little doubt that while a few of Bin Saud's young troops are genuinely keen, being encouraged by the prospect of loot, the vast majority of his Town and tribal levies (I do not include Hejaz troops) have no stomach at all for operations in the distant south, and have only been persuaded to march, through fear, and in some cases under definite compulsion. Matters are not helped by the knowledge of the great privations which last year's expedition experienced and/



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٥ظ] (٣٣٢/١١٠)





Fro

MIS

"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٥٥] "الملف

- 2 -

and by the dread Asir disease which carried off $\frac{3}{4}$ of Ibn Musa'ad's force. Nor do the wonderful stories of the armaments possessed by the Imam Yahya tend to encourage the northern Bedouin.

What every one dreads above everything, according to my Bedouin informants, are the Yemen army's "chickens" (Dajaj), which come "running along the ground, bouncing and jumping and then explode when the reach their objective". These "chickens" were, it is said, used with deadly effect on the Yam tribe of Nejran and the tales that are told of these infernal machines have caused widespread despondency and alarm.

(COMMENT. Obviously Mills Bombs, or something similar).

Already the news is filtering through to Kuwait of many secret desertions from the Army as it moved down the Wadi Duwasir.

So great is the unpopularity of the King's impending war that in the view of many experienced tribal leaders, Bin Saud will be very ill advised if he risks a pitched battle with the Yemen forces anywhere. The idea being that his army will melt away like chaff before wind, if fortune in any way goes against it.

The Shaikh of Kuwat as well as the writer, for the above and other obvious reasons, more than ever, hold the view that the King, who must be given full credit of knowing what his people are thinking about, and how unpopular is his little war, has no intention of fighting, let alone invading Yemen; and that the whole business of mobilizing and sending a large force to Asir, is a manoeuvre pure and simple to make the Imam Yahya believe that the Kingdom of "Saudiyeh" is in earnest and intends mischef. At the last moment, no doubt, the King will ask the Imam Yahya to agree to some simple and very easy solution of the difficulties that exist.

Honour/



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠ظ] (٣٣٢/١١٢)

and by the dread Asir disease which carried off & of Ibn Musa'ad's force. Nor do the wonderful stories of the armaments possessed by the Imam Yahya tend to encourage the northern Bedouin.

What every one dreads above everything, according to my Bedouin informants, are the Yemen army's "obickens" (Dajaj), which come "running along the ground, bouncing and jumping and then explode when the reach their objective". These "ohickens" were, it is said, used with deadly effect on the Yam tribe of Nejran and the tales that are told of these infernal machines have caused widespread despondency and alarm.

(COMMENT. Obviously Mills Bombs, or something similar).

Already the news is filtering through to Kuwait of many secret desertions from the Army as it moved down the Wadi Duwasir.

So great is the unpopularity of the King's impending war that in the view of many experienced tribal leaders, Bin Saud will be very ill advised if he risks a pitched battle with the Temen forces anywhere. The idea being that his army will melt away like chaff before wind, if fortune in any way goes against it.

The Shaikh of Kuwat as well as the writer, for the above and other obvious reasons, more than ever, hold the view that the King, who must be given full credit of knowing what his people are thinking about, and how unpopular is his little war, has no intention of fighting, let alone invading Yemen; and that the whole business of mobilizing and sending a large force to Asir, is a menosuvre pure and simple to make the Imam Yehya believe that the Kingdom of "Saudiyeh" is in earnest and intends mischeft. At the last moment, no doubt, the King will ask the Imam Yehya to agree to some simple and very easy solution of the difficulties that exist.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤ ٥ و] الملف 7/١١٣)

. 3 . Honour will be declared to have been satisfied, and Bin Saud will give out to his people that he has forced Yemen to come to terms and will march home a conqueror. No doubt there will be a certain amount of petty skirmishing, but not, it is believed, a big battle. The Shaikh of Kuwait's appreciation of the situa-05 tion given to the writer on 19th October 1933, is quoted below in as far as possible his own words. It is interesting and shows considerable shrewdness. Yahya always was and is like a hedgehog (gunfith). He can kill and eat such dangerous things as poisonous snakes and scorpions hts if he finds them alone, but if supported by a bigger animal or a"man", he will roll into a ball and act on the defensive, showing only a "spiky" and awkward front: (ii) Bin Saud on the other hand is like the proverbial wolf (dhib). It will only attack sheep when results are certain, but if it sees that object of its greed is well defended (by good watchdogs) and ready to attack back. he will snarl, make a great fuss, and pretend to be ready to fight, but will most assuredly give ground and eventually bolt always provided the dogs are bold and rush in. (iii) Bin Saud for the moment far from wanting to fight Yemen, fears an invasion of Asir, he will definitely try and defend that 800 T country if he feels he can successfully do so, but if he feels he cannot, he will make peace at once, and on any terms.

(iv) No general war with Yemen will take place. Peace talks are already going on behind the scenes for both wolf and hedgehog




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤ ٥ ظ] الملف 77/١١٤)

Honour will be declared to have been satisfied, and Bin Seud will give out to his people that he has forced Yemen to come to terms and will march home a conqueror. ytted to theome mistree a ed lilw erent touch of skirmishing, but not, it is believed, a big battle. The Shaikh of Kuwait's appreciation of the situation given to the writer on 19th October 1935, is quoted gnitaerethi at JI .abrow nwo aid eldissog as raf as ni woled and shows considerable shrewdness. (t) Yahya always was and is like a hadgehog (gunfith). He can kill and eat such dangeranoiquose bus semans auonostoq as aguidt auo if he finds them alone, but if supported by a bigger enimal or a"man", he will roll into a bell and act on the defensive, showing only a "spiky" and swkward front: (11) Bin Saud on the other hand is like the Mosts wino iliw ti . (didb) low isidrevorq th it jud , nistree ers atluser nedw queda sees that object of its greed is well defended (by good watchdogs) and ready to attack back, he will smarl, make a great fuer, and pretend therwass from Illw but that of theer ed of eive ground and eventually bolt always provided the dogs are bold and rush in. (111) Bin Saud for the moment far from wanting to fight Yemen, fears an invasion of Asir, tent bnefeb bne yrt yletinifeb lliw en country if he feels he can successfully do solam Illw ed , tonneo ed aleet ed li jud ,os peace at once, and on any terms. (1v) No general war with Yemen will take place. Peace talks are already going on behind the scenes for both wolf and hedgehog




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٥٥]





"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٥ظ] (٣٣٢/١٦٦)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٩] "الملف

- 5 -

55 (56)

hidden since when he has been gradually edging west to the Kraa al Maru ridge west of the Jahara - Safwan - Basra road where grazing is reported good. With him are the Bani Hussain section of the Dhafir who throughout the Summer were camped at Safwan ('Iraq) and who have made themselves rather notorious over their "smuggling" activities lately.

(d) ANNAZE.

During October a few small parties both from the Amarat and Dahamsha visited Kuwait and bought up supplies, which they said they were going to take to Syria - a rather tall story in the opinion of the writer.

(e) RAINS.

With the advent of the rainy season, tribal concentrations ere on wells are everywhere breaking up and tribes are generally moving off to winter grazing grounds.

II.RIATH NEWS AND WAR RUMOURS.

- 1. During October news from Riath has come in more regularly, and with greater frequency than before, and in spite of the King's very strict censorship the veil may be said to have largely lifted from happenings at the Capital.
- 2. On 10 th October a Ford car belonging to the
 King arrived at Kuwait from Riath, the driver having instructions to convey some ladies (who had come from Zubair)
 back to Riath. The driver who is well known in the Town
 brought the following information, which has since been
 amply confirmed from several other sources:
 - (a) The final concentration of Bin
 Jaloui's force and the Riath force
 took place early in October, and the
 combined army proceeded south in successive echelons via the Dawasir



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٦] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٦]

hidden since when he has been gradually edging west to the Kras al Maru ridge west of the Jahara - Safwan - Basra road inse ent ers mid dilw .boog betroger at gnizarg eredw Hussain section of the Dhafir who throughout the Summer were camped at Safwan ('Iraq') and who have made themselves .vletel acitivites "gailggume" miedt reve auctroton redter (d) ANWAZE. mort diod selfrag llama we's a redotoO garring qu thauod bne tiswul betistv sdameded bne terema ent supplies, which they said they were going to take to Syria - a rather tall story in the opinion of the writer. (e) RAINS. Laditi the advent of the rainy season, tribal concentrations ere on wells are everywhere breaking up and tribes are generally moving off to winter grazing tank of santation by II. RIATH NEWS AND WAR HUMOURS. During October news from Riath has come in more regularly, and with greater frequency than before, and in spite of the King's very strict censorship the veil may be said to have largely lifted from happenings at the 2. On 10th October a Ford car belonging to the King arrived at Kuwait from Riath, the driver having instructions to convey some ladies (who had come from Zubair) back to Histh. The driver who is well known in the Town brought the following information, which has since been smply confirmed from several other sources: ata to notisataeonoo fanti edT (a) Jaloui's force and the Riath force took place early in October, and the combined army proceeded south in euc-Tisswal ent siv anoleme evissen



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٩٧] (٣٣٢/١١٩)

- 6 4



Dawasir valley, from the 5th October to the 7th Of October.

- (b) The total strength of the concentration was some 9,000 fighting men, (4,000 from Hassa and 5,000 from the Riath district).
- (c) The combined force which moved from Riath was under the nominal command of Faisal bin Sa'ad, the King's nephew, a not particularly striking youngman of about 21 years of age known to the writer.
- (d) The King's orders to Faisal bin Sa'ad were that he should proceed to Bisha and Raniya at the southern end of the Wadi Dawasir, where he would meet the King's second son Faisal, Vicercy of the Hejaz, who would take over the supreme command from him.
- (e) Up to the time when the Army moved off no one knew whether from Bisha the destination of the force would be Najran via Tathlith etc, or Ebha.
- (f) The Riath force before it marched suffered greatly from sickness due, it was said, to dirt and lack of the most elementary semitary precautions on the part of the King's Government. The various large Bedouin contingents, which had arrived daily throughout the month of September, and had greatly congested the already overcrowded capital, had obviously contaminated the water supply, with the result reported.

COMMENT.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠ الملف 73/١٢٠)

- 6 ent of redotoo did ent mort, vellay risawaC .Tedotoo 16 dt -entreence ent to digneria Letot ent (d) (4,000 tighting men, (4,000 from Hasse and 5,000 from the Risth . (tolitalb (c) The combined force which moved from To busmuco lenimon edt tehnu sew dialf s , wengen a'gnil ent, ba'sa nid lastaT To nemgnuov guiditte viraluoitraq ton about 21 years of age - known to the . Telliw bs's2 mid festsT of stebro s'gmlN edT (b) salel of beeoorg bloods of tant erew were the should proceed to Bishs ent to bue arentuos ent ta sylman bas Wadi Dawasir, where he would meet the King's second son Falsal, Vicercy of the Hejaz, who would take over the supreme command from him. bevom ymra edt nedw emit edt ot qU (e) off no one knew whether from Bisha the nertal ed bloow eorol edt lo noltaniteeb bedoram il eroled eorol disin edT (1) suffered greatly from alckness due, it teom edt to doel bas trib ot blas saw elementary smitery precautions on the part of the King's Government. The various large Bedouin contingents, which had arrived daily throughout the month of September, and had greatly congested the already overcrowded capital, had obviously ontaminated the water supply, with the .bej moger fluser COMMENT.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٩٠] (٣٣٢/١٢١)

· 7 -



COMMENT. From the symptoms reported i.e. a 21 day-sickness, the probabilities are that the outbreak was of an enteric nature.

- (g) Many secret desertions took place before the force moved off.
- (h) The Imam Yahya was reported to have written to the King in September and begged him not to go to war in which many Muslims would unnecessarily perish. He, the Imam, was ready to fall in with all the King's wishes, but his difficulty lay in the fact that his son Saif ul Islam Ahmad had got out of hand. Bin Saud replied in similar vein that he too was averse to war, but that he had four hot-headed sons none of whom could he control.

 These were marching on Yemen against his (Bin Saud's) will.
- (3) The following news was supplied by the Shaikh of Kuwait on 19th October:
- (a) On the 18th October an Ajman tribesmen in Kuwait service arrived from Riath confirming the motor drivers report in detail.
- (b) The man also brought the news that it was pretty certain that the now famous Riath prisoners Naif bin Hithlain Ibn Lamis and Ibn Humaid, had been murdered by Bin Saud's orders. They had apparently been sent in 3 lorries ostensibly to Hoffuf, in response to the long made demand of Ibn Jaloui, that the prisoners should be dealt with by him. The lorries had, it seems, never reached Hoffuf, but returned empty to Riath the next day. It was everywhere in Riath whispered that the prisoners had been shot and buried in the Dahana sands by a party sent by Ibn Jaloui to take them over. In this connection see para V.b.(ix) and V.c.(i) of



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠٨] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠٨]

COMMENT. From the symptoms reported 1.e. a 21 day-sickness, the probabilities oliejne us lo saw keerdio edi jadi era na ture. (g) Many secret desertions took place before the force moved off. (h) The Imam Yahya was reported to have -ged bus reducines and gail edt of nettirw ged him not to go to war in which many Muslims would unnecessarily perish. He, the Imam, was ready to fall in with all the Ming's wishes, but his difficulty lay in the fact that his son Sair ul Islam Ahmad had got out of hand. Bin Saud replied in similar vein that he too was averse bebsed-jod ruo's bad ed jad tud . new of .louinos ed bluos modw to enon anos These were merching on Yemen against his (Bin Saud's) will. (3) The following news was supplied by the Shaikh of Kuwait on 19th October: (a) On the 18th October an Ajman tribesmen in Kuwait savirb rotom ent gaingting of sid mort bevire estress report in detail. (d) The man else brought the news that it was pretty oertain that the now famous Risth prisoners Naif bin Hithlain Ibn Lamis and Ibn Humsid, had been murdered by Bin Saud's orders. They had apparently been sent in 3 lorries ostensibly to Hoffuf, in response to the long made demand of Ibn Jeloui, that the prisoners should be dealt with by him. The lorries had, it seems, never reached Hoffuf, but returned empty to Risth the next day. It was everywhere in Risth whispered that the prisoners had been shot and burried in the Dahana sands by a perty sent by Ibn Jaloui to take them over. In this connection see para V.b. (ix) and V.c. (i) of



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٩]

-8-

of this office Summary for August 1933.

COMMENT. The story of the murder of these unfortunate wretches has reached Kuwait from so many sources during September and October that I cannot but come to the regretful conclusion that the incident is true.

The Ajman and Mutair tribes hoping against hope that Ibn Hathlain and Ibn Lamia, their chieftains were still alive, have refused so far to believe that Ibn Saud would lend himself to such a dastardly deed, but even they have resigned themselves to what they believe to be the truth at last.

It is said that no one but members of Bin Saud's slave bodyguard accompanied the prisoners when they set out in the lorries, and that even the lorry drivers were slaves. Hence there were no Arab eye witnesses of the deed, for slaves donot ever talk. Three things however are certain and have been amply corroborated by Ajman and Mutair tribal report:

- (a) The prisoners actually set out for Hoffuf and were seen.
- (b) The old Ajman woman who cooked the prisoners' food and sent it to their prison daily, was told she need no longer cook their food as the prisoners had left the previous day for Hassa.
- (c) The prisoners never reached Hoffuf.

 COMMENT. Ibn Jaloui had many times and publicly vowed that he would take the life of Naif ibn Hathlain for the part he took in the killing of his son Fahad bin Jaloui in 1929 as well as execute Ibn Lami and Ibn Humaid if they ever fell into his hands. The Kings leniency where these men were concerned had for long caused a "coolness" between the Governor of Hassa and his Master.



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٥ظ] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٥ظ]

of this office Summary for August 1933. COMMENT. The story of the murder of these unfortunate wretches has reached Kuwait from so many sources during -jerger end of empo jud jommeo I tadt redoted has redmejqe2 .euri et ineb tent ent tent noteulonce lui The Ajman and Mutair tribes hoping against hope that Ibn Hathlain and Ibn Land; their chieftains were buse ndI tedt evelled of rel os besuler eved , evils Ilits would lend himself to such a dastardly deed, but even they ent ed of evelled year tank of seviesment bengiser even truth at last. a buse ald to sredmem tud eno on tadt biss at tI slave bodyguard accompanied the prisoners when they set out in the lorries, and that even the lorry drivers were slaves. Hence there were no Arab eye witnesses of the deed, for slaves donot ever talk. Three things however are certain and have been amply corroborated by Ajman and Mutair tribal (a) The prisoners actually set out for . mess stew bas fulfor ent bestood on namew name Ablo ent (d) nos ing wient of fi these bus bool 'srenceing rieds wood regnol on been eds blos asw , vlisb auctiverq edt fiel bed amenosing edt as bool pertern that day for Hassa. The Land and (c) The prisoners never reached Hoffuf. COMMENT. Ibn Jalout had many times and publicly vowed ends to a mishitaH and than to still ends exest bluow end stant part he took in the killing of his son Fahad bin Jalout in 1929 as well as execute Ibn Lami and Ibn Humaid if they ever fell into his hands. The Kings leniency where these men were concerned had for long caused a "coolness" between the Governor of Hassa and his Master.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠٠]

(c) In view of the King's written assurance to His Majesty's Government, given through the late Sir Hugh Biscoe at Khabari Wadtha after the Akhwan rebellion of 1929/30 that Ibn Hathlain and Ibn Lami would not be put to death, but with Faisal al Duwish would only be kept in prison for a reasonable period, if they were handed over by His Majesty's Government, it is hoped that Jedda will cause careful and exhaustive enquiries to be made into the truth of the above story. The incident is of the highest importance in Bedouin eyes for all know of the promise

men have indeed been 'put away'.

4. The following news was supplied by the Shaikh
of Kuwait to the writer on 25th October:

given by the King to His Majesty's Government, and England will be accused of a greivous breach of faith if these


(a) The report was widely current in Riath and Kuwait that His Majesty's Government was financing Bin Saud for his coming war with Yemen and had given him two loans.

Note. The Shaikh enquired if I had heard anything to this effect.

- (b) Bin Jaloui had executed 2 Mutair tribesmen(Jiblan) 2 Mutair ditto (Braih): 1 Nejdi townsman; for having been caught with merchandise on their persons whilst crossing from Kuwait into Nejd.
- (c) He, the Shaikh, had received a letter from one of his subjects in Aden (by Air Mail from Karachi), dated 12th October to the effect that Nejran had been evacuated by the Imam Yahya except for 3 strong forts (which had been erected), and all Yemen troops had proceeded to the Sabiya front.
- (d) Al Shuwaish hitherto one of Bin Saud's most
 popular and trusty friends and counsellors, and for long
 entrusted/



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠٠]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦٠ و] الملف 7/١٢٧)

- 10 -

60 61

entrusted with the royal camel herds, was suddenly arrested in Riath about 19th October and thrown into prison. All his tents, property etc. etc., had been confiscated and his womenfolk brought to Riath by a certain Al Ribai, another of the King's most trusty henchmen.

COMMENT. The above news has caused much concern among the Mutair (Jiblan Section), among whom Al Shuwaish was an outstending and respected figure. No charge has, as far as one can make out, been preferred against the man.

III. BLOCKADE.

- (a) Nothing of importance to report under this head, except the savage beheading by Ibn Jaloui's orders of the 5 men caught smuggling (See the immediately preceding para (b).)
- (b) Reference para III(b) of September Summary.

Letters have reached the sons (in Kuwait) of the one of the Anaiza merchants recently arrested by the King for trading with Kuwait to the effect that before their father's release the King held a Durbar of tribesmen and Townsmen in Riath and swore publicly that if he caught anyone of his subjects trading with or being in possession of goods ememating from Kuwait, he would not only confiscate his camels and the goods but would have the man executed on the spot. He, the King, had called upon God, all those present, and all who could not be present, to bear witness that he had given this solemn warning so that no one should have cause to complain afterwards, if he slew regardless of mercy. The King added that he had already sent orders to his frontier officials near Kuwait to carry out these instructions to the letter.

The sons were warned by their father to be extra careful.

IV.



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦١] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦٠١]

- 10 betaeris vinebbus asw , shred lemso layor ent dilw betaerine in Risth about 19th October and thrown into prison. All his tents, property etc. etc., had been confiscated and his womenfolk brought to Risth by a certain Al Ribai, another of the King's most trusty henchmen. COMMENT. The above news has caused much concern among the -Juo ms asw maiswude la monw gnoms (no boes naidll) miatum standing and respected figure. No charge has, as far as one can make out, been preferred against the man. III. BLOCKADE. (a) Nothing of importance to report under this head, ent to savege beheating by Ibn Jalou's orders of the 5 men caucht snuccling (See the immediately preceding para (b).) (b) Reference para III(b) of September Summary. eff to (tiswull nt) snos off before eved arettel one of the Ansiza merchants recently arrested by the King Tient eroled tant toelle ent ot tiswul diw guibert wol father's release the King held a Durbar of tribeamen and Townsmen in Risth and swore publicly that if he caught anyone of his subjects trading with or being in possession of goods emenating from Kuwait, he would not only confis--exe nam ent even bluow tud aboog ent has elemse aid etso outed on the spot. He, the King, had called upon God, of those mesent, and all who could not be present, to bear witness that he had given this solemn warning so it abnewietle misignes of eause eved bluode eno on fadt he slew regardless of mercy. The King added that he had thewall reen elabilito relinori aid of arebro ince wheerla to carry out these instructions to the letter. The sons were warned by their father to be extra



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٦و] (٣٣٢/١٢٩)

- 11 -

IV. GENERAL.

- (a) On 13th October one Saced bin Abdulla Asiri arrived from Transjordan ostensibly to buy "Abbahs". He left again on 15th October.
- (b) On 24th Khan Sahib Shaikh Farhan al Rahma of Basra, a personal friend of the writer and one well known to the Royal Air Force Intelligence Department, returned from Riath via Bahrain (by up slow mail). He had repaired there last August. He sent a letter ashore describing his journey and confirming all Riath news as given above, including the murder of the unfortunate "Riath prisoners". Shaikh Farhan mentioned that he had met Mr.Twitchell of the Standard Oil Co., Ltd. and that the latter had seemed most enthusiastic regarding Oil all over the Hassa Province.

V. OIL.

- (a) K.S.Shaikh Farhan (mentioned in the previous para, IV 'b') informed the writer that Riath gossip had it that Bin Saud had insisted that the Shaikh of Qatar went to Riath in connection with Oil and that Bin Saud had insisted that he, the Shaikh, should break with the A.P.O.C., and give the final Qatar Concession to the Standard Oil.
 - (b) In a subsequent conversation on the same subject which the writer had with the Shaikh of Kuwait on 26th October 1935, the latter gave for what it was worth, the following piece of Riath Palace gossip, which had reached Kuwait by trustworthy
 - (i) The man who had got the Shaikh of Kuwait to go to Riath, had been Mehomed al Mana (a very pro Bin Saud individual) acting under King's the/instructions.
 - (ii) At a secret interview with the King the latter had asked his guest what he meant by

giving/

61 62



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٦ظ]

- II -IV. GENERAL. Devirus trisa silubda mid beess emo redojoo disi mo from Transjordan ostensibly to buy"Abbaha". He left again on 15th October. On 24th Khan Sahib Shaikh Farhan al Rahma of Basra, edt of awond flew eno bas retirw edt to baeirt famoareg a Royal Air Force Intelligence Department, returned from Riath feel eredt berteger bad eH . (Ilam wole qu yd) nierded eiv August. He sent a letter ashore describing his journey and -Tum edf guibulont , evode moving as awen dista Ile guimrifuco der of the unfortunate "Riath prisoners". Shaikh Farhan 110 bushnest end to IledestwT. TM tem bad ed tedt benettnem oliasiaudine taom bemees bed rettal ent tant bas .btl .. 00 regarding Oil all over the Hassa Province. . IIO.V K.S. Shaikh Farhan (mentioned in the previous para, nid tedt ti bad qizzog disiR tedt retirw edt bemroini ('d' Saud had insisted that the Shaikh of Quter went to Right the connection with Oil and that Bin Saud had insisted that he, the Shaikh, should break with the A.P.C.C., and give the final Catar Concession to the Standard Oil. In a subsequent conversation on the same subject which the writer had with the Shaikh of Kuwait on 25th October 1935, the latter gave for what it was worth, the following piece of Riath Palace gossip, which had reached Kuwait by trustworthys tiswull to dailed ent too bad onw mam ent (1) to go to Risth, had been Mehomed al Mana (a rebnu gaitos (Leubivibat busa ala orq yrev the instructions. ent gnil ent ditw weivreini jerosa a tA (11) yd insem ed jadw isewy sid bedsa bad rejjal * glving/




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦٣و]

- 12 giving an exploitation concession to the A.P.O.C. Did he wish Qatar to become like Bahrain, a complete dependency of the English? If so he was going the right way about it. If he gave the A.P.O.C. the final Oil Concession, had he asked himself, what would happen? The English would assuredly expect safety and protection for the Company's Engineers etc., from him, the Shaikh of Qatar, and failing effective protection, they would as assured -ly land troops or bring aeroplanes to do it for him. If the Shaikh was unreasonable he, Bin Saud, would certainly see that this came about, inspite of anything that he, the Shaikh, could say; for Nejd tribesmen had an awkward way of getting out of hand and attacking where they were least expected to attack. The first to be hurt would be the A.P.O.C. refineries (at his instigation of course). The English would then be forced to act and take over Qatar, or at least the protection of the A.P.O.C. community. If on the other hand he, the Shaikh, was sensible and gave the concession to the King's protegės, the Standard Oil Co., of America, why, then everything would be "couleur de rose" for him, and the British would get no chance at all of getting a footing in his State as all Nejd Bedouins would know how to behave themselves. COMMENT. No doubt the Political Agent, Bahrain, has also heard the above story, and can say what the true facts are. The tale however rings true, for his threat of Nejd Bedouins



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٣ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠ و] "الملف 7/١٣٣)

- 13 -

Bedouins getting out of hand, is a favourite dodge of the King, when judicious pressure is required to be brought to bear on a person who does not quite see eye to eye with him. It has been tried against Kuwait before now, and indeed may again be attempted before long.

63 64

A reliable Bedouin, who looks after the writer's \frac{\text{VI}_\text{2}}{\text{VI}_\text{2}} camp arrangements in Kuwait, and who was in Riath during the Shaikh of Qatar's whole visit there, reported that the first story that went around was that the Shaikh of Qatar's country had been seized by the British and the Shaikh and party had come to appeal to Bin Saud for help. Later this was denied and it was said the visit was purely a friendly one. Before he returned home, Shaikh Abdulla ibn Thani was given a present of 5 new Ford motor cars by the King, and 4 mares and 1 stallion by Ibn Jaloui.

VI. FIRING ON KUWAIT DHOW BY 'IRAQ CUSTOMS LAUNCH.

On the night of 12th October, a small dhow, crew of five, owned in Kuwait, by two domiciled Persiana, subjects of the Shaikh, was returning empty from Bandar DILAM, a port in Persia, when it was attacked by an armed Customs launch belonging to the Fao ('Iraq) Customs service. The Officer in charge of the launch apparently hailed the dhow in the early morning (1 o' Clock Arabic), and ordered it to heave to. As the crew did not hear the hail, they did nothing, whereupon the launch opened a sharp fire on the dhow, killing the Nakhuda and wounding two of her crew. The Customs officer one Hussain Effendi then boarded the dhow, but found no cargo on board. He next proceeded to take the dhow in tow and conveyed her to Fao, where the Police apparently took the case in hand. The incident is said to have taken place close to Ras Bubiyan, (i.e. near the old Turkish Fort, which is situated on the Island of



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠ظ]

- 15 -

Bedouins getting out of hand, is a favourite dodge of the King, when judicious pressure is required to be brought to bear on a person who does not quite see eye to eye with him. It has been tried against Kuwait before now, and indeed may again be attempted before long.

A reliable Bedouin, who looks after the writer's oamp arrangements in Kuwait, and who was in Riath during the Shaikh of Catar's whole visit there, reported that the first story that went around was that the Shaikh of Catar's country had been seized by the British and the Shaikh and party had come to appeal to Bin Saud for help. Later this was denied and it was said the visit was purely a friendly one. Before he returned home, Shaikh Abdulla ibn Thani was given a present of 5 new Ford motor cars by the King, and 4 mares and 1 stallion by Ibn Jaloui.

VI. FIRING ON KUWAIT IHOW BY 'IRAQ GUSTOMS TAUNCH.

On the night of 12th October, a small dhow, orew of five, owned in Kuwait, by two domiciled Persiana, subjects of the Shaikh, was returning empty from Bandar DILAM, a port in Persia, when it was attacked by an armed Customs launch belonging to the Fao ('Iraq) Customs service. The Officer in charge of the launch apparently hailed the dhow in the early morning (1 o' Clock Arabic), and ordered it to heav to. As the crew did not hear the hail, they did nothing, whereupon the launch opened a sharp fire on the dhow, killing the Nakhuda and wounding two of her orew. The Customs officer one Hussein Effendi then boarded the dhow, but found no cargo on board. He next proceeded to take the dhow in tow and conveyed her to Fao, where the Police apparently took the case in hand. The incident is said to have taken place close to Ras Bubiyan, (i.e. near to old Turkish Fort, which is situated on the Island of

1043



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٦٥]

- 14 -

by (5)

Island of that name) and the survivors protested to the Police that they had been shot up outside 'Iraq waters, and generally brutally treated in the manner described, inspite of the fact that their craft was entirely empty and they were innocently returning to Kuwait from a voyage to Persia.

The Police, who from various accounts received in Kuwait, took the part of the dhow, asked Hussain Effendi to show them the exact spot where the incident took place. This Hussain Effendi made out to be West of the Fao peninsula opposite the date gardens known as Al Duwasir, although the two survivors very strongly protested that this was not so. At the Shaikh's request a telegraphic protest was at once made to the Hon'ble the Political Resident at Bushire for onward transmission to the 'Iraq Government, and a full report is being made of the incident which from the Kuwait point of view is a serious one. This is the second occasion when a Kuwait dhow has been "shot up" with loss in killed and wounded because the Nakhuda did not heave towhen told to do so on the high seas.

VII. AGRARIAN TROUBLES IN SHAIKH OF KUWAIT'S FAO PROPERTY.

The serious agrarian troubles which broke out in the Shaikh of Kuwait's Fao Estate on the Shatt al Arab early in the Summer, and which lasted throughout July, August and September were brought to a successful conclusion on ing 8th October, The end coincided with the departure of the Mutasarrif of Basra to another part of 'Iraq. The origin of the trouble was shrouded in mystery, and outwardly showed itself in the form of an appeal to the Mutasarrif, Basra by certain fellahs for protection against the Shaikh, who was made out to have usurped the property from themselves, the real owners of the soil. The Mutasarrif from the first took the side of the fellaheen, and nearly succeeded in bringing



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٦ ظ]

- 14 -

Island of that name) and the survivors protested to the Police that they had been shot up outside 'Iraq waters, and generally brutally treated in the manner described, inspite of the fact that their craft was entirely empty and they were innocently returning to Kuwait from a voyage to Persia.

The Police, who from various accounts received in Kuwait, took the part of the dhow, asked Hussain Effendito show them the exact spot where the incident took place. This Hussain Effendi made out to be West of the Fac peninsula opposite the date gardens known as Al Duwasir, although the two survivors very strongly protested that this was not so. At the Shaikh's request a telegraphic protest was at once made to the Hon'ble the Political Resident at Bushire for onward transmission to the 'Iraq Government, and a full report is being made of the incident which from the Kuwait when a Kuwait dhow has been "shot up" with loss in Killed and wounded because the Nakhuda did not heave towhen told to do so on the high seas.

VII.AGRARIAN TROUBLES IN SHAINH OF KUWAIT'S FAO PROPERTY.

The serious agrarian troubles which broke out in the Shaikh of Kuwait's Fac Estate on the Shatt al Arab early in the Summer, and which lasted throughout July, August and September were brought to a successful conclusion on the Sta Cotober, The end coincided with the departure of the Mutasarrif of Basra to another part of 'Iraq. The origin of the trouble was shrouded in mystery, and outwardly showed itself in the form of an appeal to the Mutasarrif, Basra by certain fellahs for protection against the Shaikh, who was made out to have usurped the property from themselves, the real owners of the soil. The Mutasarrif from the first took the side of the fellaheen, and nearly succeeded in bringing



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦٦٠] (٣٣٢/١٣٧)

- 15 -

65 60

bringing about a most ugly and serious situation.

Fortunately the Shaikh ably supported by his Basra lawyer and Agent, successfully countered the various moves of the fellaheen and the Mutasarrif and by tactful and diplomatic methods, terminated the dispute in the satisfactory manner recorded. The Shaikh suggests that the whole incident was an attack against himself and was inspired from Baghdad, but it is difficult to prove this. The curious part of the business is that the property has been in the Shaikh's family for close on 100 years, and never before have the tenants given the slightest trouble, or ever expressed dissatisfaction against their landlord.

VIII. ASSYRIAN TROUBLES.

A prominent Basra notable (name need not be divulged) visited Kuwait early in the month and in conversation with the Shaikh gave the following appreciation of the Assyrian trouble. This is given below, with due apologies, as an interesting example of how certain politically minded Basrawis, viewed that unfortunate business.

- (a) Had not the Assyrian trouble eventuated, there was to have been a Shiah tribal rising on the Eupherates.
- (b) The Assyriem situation gave the 'Iraq Government a heaven sent chance of turning the peoples minds in the direction of an anti-English and anti-Christian campaign, with the result that (a) above did not come off.
- (c) The Turkish Minister in Baghdad had a large hand in the Assyrian business and advised the Government to adopt the strong measures they did which followed good Turkish precedent. Explanations could always be given later in order to put 'Iraq right with His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations.
 - (d) The Army however went too far, and Govern-



"الملف 53/76 53/76) II) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦٦ظ] (٣٣٢/١٣٨)

- 15 -. noitaut le avoires bus vigu teom a tuoda guignind Fortunately the Shaikh ably supported by his Basra lawyer and Agent, successfully countered the various moves of -oldip pur englishes and the Mutasarric and pay tactful and diplomatic methods, terminated the dispute in the satisfactory manner recorded. The Shaikh suggests that the whole incident was an attack against himself and was inspired from Baghdad, end to trag audimo enT .aint every of fluctifith at the business is that the property has been in the Shaikh's family for close on 100 years, and never before have the this -alb besserque reve ro . elduort tsetfgils eft nevig stanet .broibnal riedt tanisga noitostaitas VIII. ASSYRIAM TROUBLES. # EZ 200 A prominent Basra notable (name need not be hgla -noo at has alone ent at virse tiswed bester (beginvib versation with the Shaikh gave the following appreciation of the Assyrian trouble. This is given below, with due bit apologies, as an interesting example of how certain politi-15 (5) .ssenizud efanut rohnu tahi bewelv ,a lwaraad bebnim yilso tim (a) Had not the Assyrian trouble eventuated, there was to have been a Shish tribel rising on the Eupherstes. (d) The Assyrian situation gave the 'Iraq Government a heaven sent chance of turning the peoples minds in the direction of an anti-English and anti-Ohristian campaign, with the result that (a) above did not come off. (o) The Turkish Minister in Baghdad had a large hand in the Assyrian business and advised the Government to adopt the strong measures they did which followed good Turkish precedent. Explanations could always be given later in order to put 'Iraq right with His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations. (d) The Army however went too far, and Govern-




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٧و] (٣٣٢/١٣٩)

- 16 and Government realized too late that England had been deeply roused as well as League of Nations. Order, went forth to all officials to go out of their way to please the English, so as to get them on their side at Geneva. (e) Strong efforts were at the same time made to prevent an independent enquiry by the League of Nations. England had at all costs to be dragged in - a not difficult task, as it was believed that she would have to see 'Iraq through her difficulty, owing to the fact that she herself had sponsored her independence. (f) As soon as League of Nations enquiry was over, in the opinion of the informant, there would be another heavy anti-English attack throughout country against England, all inspired from Baghdad. (g) The informant further gave it as his opinion that His Majesty's Government would do well to allow an independent enquiry, even though it meant blame for herself, as only thus would England regain the confidence of other minorities in 'Iraq, both Jew and Christian. The Shaikh repeated to the writer the above story, though he was careful to say they were not necessarily his own views. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, As Drelin Lt.-Colonel, Political Agent, Kuwait. VSS.




"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠ظ] (الملف 7/١٤٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٨و] (٣٣٢/١٤١)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٨ظ] (٣٣٢/١٤٢)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦٩] (٣٣٢/١٤٣)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٦٩ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧٠و] (٣٣٢/١٤٥)

	69 (70)
	- 8 -
	against the King and his Government. The tribes
	everywhere are rebellious, and the townsmen
	especially the people of Aridhand Qasim are disloy
	al to the love.
(b)	The hitherto fanatical Akhwan on whom the King
	used to rely, no longer exist as such. Their
	fanaticism has gone and they are definitely an
	exploded and broken force.
(0)	The campaign towards Yemen is highly unpopular,
	and there are indications that the Imam Yahya
	has successfully 'got at' some of Bin Saud's most
	reliable tribes, notably the Ataiba and Harb. It
	is openly whispered in Riath that this is so.
(d)	Of the Hassa and Riath contingents, which were sent
	south under Faisel ibn Sa'ad al Saud, half deserted
	before they were two days out of the capital. The
	outstanding examples being the Awazim, Mutair and
	Harb. The first arrived at the capital some 600
	strong, but only 150 marched south.
(e)	The King is fully aware of his unpopularity, and
	does not dare leave his capital and lead his
	Army himself. Nor will he allow his son Saud to
	leave Nejd for the same reason.
(1)	There is no question at all of Bin Saud invading
	Yemen or Najran, on the contrary he is on the
	defensive already and straining every nerve to
	save Asir from the large, well equipped and
	organized army that the Imam Yahya is collecting,
	on the Asir front.
(g)	It is even talked about in Riath that Yahya's
	objective is Mecca itself, but 'Palace' circles
	say that the King will make peace and surrender
	Asir before anything so serious as that happens.
(h)	(h)/



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧٠٠]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١ /و] (٣٣٢/١٤٧)

- 3 -(h) Should the Saudian forces in Asir suffer the slightest reverse, then the Nejd army of Bedouin irregulars will at once melt away and without a doubt outbreaks will occur in various directions in Nejd, commencing with passive defiance of Tax gatherers authority. (i) Much anti-English talk is the fashion in the Capital, and from the King downwards, England is made out to be everything that is bad and to be slowly working for the downfall of the Saudi dynasty. (j) The King himself frequently discussed this very question with Shaikh Shunaif, and asked him on more than one occasion, about 'Iraq and His Majesty's Government's present methods there. When he, Shunaif, defended British policy and Englishmen generally, the King invariably ended up with the impatient expression, "Oh! You simple Satadunis. You do not know the English as I do. They have got us all by the throat and will not let go till they have throttled and killed us. Look at their treatment of me". (And much more in this vein). (k) Spee Saud the son of the King gave out in public Mejliss and in the presence of the informer that the English had deliberately poisoned the late King Faisal, and that there was no doubt of that at all, say what they liked. Speaking generally the impression gathered by Shaikh Shunaif during his so journ at Riath was (a) That Bin Saud was completely on the rocks financially, and that his Kingdom was not far from the 'breaking up' point: (b) That Bin Saud had changed his old methods



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧٠ ا] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٧و] (٣٣٢/١٤٩)

- 4 -

71 72

methods of rule, from those of a benevolent


'Shaikhly Ruler' to those of a 'cruel despot'

(c) That Bin Saud and his whole family were
to-day definitely enti-English, and were publiely putting all their troubles at Great
Britain's door.

- 5. As regards (a) and (b) above, Shaikh Shunaif opined that the King's changed and foolish methode of dealing with his tribes was entirely due to the evil influence and corrupting ideas of his Syrian advisers, like Yusuf Yasin and Fuad Hamza, who had no more idea of understanding the Bedouin or treating him properly than their original mentors, the Turks. They it was, who were ever advising the King to adopt western methods with his tribes, which would never work, and only brought him into opposition (as it was doing) with the religious heads of Nejd.
- what was wanted to-day in Riath was a specially selected
 Arab speaking Englishman with, above all, knowledge of
 Arab and Bedouin psychology. Such person should be sent
 to Bin Saud's Court to propagate and improve relations.
 Heavy anti-British propaganda was all the time going on
 in Riath, the King and his family being the simple victims.
- 7. I have thought it my duty to submit the above account of my interview with this latest arrival from Nejd, as not only is the news quite fresh, but the man himself appears to be of a thinking and sensible type.
- 8. Shunaif's father and grandfather having died serving Bin Saud, his present information regarding conditions in Nejd might, at first sight, be assumed to be unbiased. I gathered, however, that Shunaif had hoped to get money from Bin Saud (he is poor), but had failed, also that during his 7 months sojourn in Riath, he had




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٧ظ] (٣٣٢/١٥٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٧و] (١٥ ٣٣٢/١٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٧ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٧و] (٣٣٢/١٥٣)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٧ظ] (٣٣٢/١٥٤)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٧٠] (٥٥ ٣٣٢/١٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٧ظ] (٣٣٢/١٥٦)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧٦] (٣٣٢/١٥٧)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٧ظ] (٣٣٢/١٥٨)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧٧و] (٩٥ ٢/١٥٩)

- 2 -

76 0

him in this view, still thinks that Bin Saud will not fight Yahya, but that peace will be declared and an arrangement come to before a serious clash takes place.

The feeling of the people of Kuwait is curiously inconsistent. Their attitude is that it would never do for Bin Saud to suffer eclipse at the hands of the Zaidi Imam of Yemen. And even though Bin Saud is cordially hated by everyone from the Shaikh down for his heartless and cruel 10 years blockade of Kuwait, family ties, sentiment and noblesse obligee would, it would seem, always in the end outweigh any personal feelings of enmity against the King, and there is little doubt in my mind, that both the Shaikh of Kuwait and his people would side with Bin Saud if ever the latter fared so This feeling is psychological badly as to be 'in extremis'. though contradictory, and should be realized by anyone trying to understand the Arabian situation. One must not forget also that the Shaikh and leading families of Kuwait are of Anaze extraction, just as Bin Saud is, and the remainder of the populace, either originate from Qasim or are closely connected with the great tribes of Nejd.

It is a case of 'blood is thicker than water'.

- (c) Saudiyeh officials views, as given me by such persons as the son of Ibrahim bin Muammar, Saudi Minister in Baghdad, Al Nafici, and Ibn Shaja'an, Commander of Blookade Troops south of Kuwait, are that (i) the Imam Yahya is now definitely alarmed at the preparations of the King of Saudiyeh and has already asked for peace; (ii) that Bin Saud has informed him that he will only agree to discuss terms provided he, the Imam Yahya, pays him an amount equal to the money expended on the mobilization that has taken place, and that a definite and clear guarantee is given him that the Idrisi, now sheltering in Yemen, will be kept under proper control, and will not be allowed to further disturb the peace of Asir ar Saudiyeh.
- (d) All reports, whether emanating from the Shaikh of Kuwait, the tribes, or Saudi officials, definitely state that



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧٧ظ]

- S high in this view, still thinks that Bin Saud will not fight Yahya, but that peace will be declared and an arrangement come to before a serious clash takes place. The feeling of the people of Kuwait is ouriously not ob neven bluow it is that it ebutite mient .inetalanconi Bin Saud to suffer solipse at the hands of the Zaidi Imam of Yemen. And even though Bin Saud is cordially hated by everyone from the Shaikh down for his heartless and orugl 10 years begildo ezzeldon bus juemijues, selt viluel, tiewul lo eb mioold would, it would seem, always in the end outweigh any personal feelings of enmity against the King, and there is little and has the wind, that both the Shaikh of Kuwait and his people would side with Bin Saud if ever the latter fared so badly as to be 'in extremis'. This feeling is psychological though contradictory, and should be realized by anyone trying to understand the Arabian situation. One must not forget size that the Shaikh and leading families of Kuwait are of Anexe extraction, just as Bin Saud is, and the remainder of the populace, either originate from Casim or are closely con-.bleW to sedirt teers ent atiw betoen .' netaw ment reweith at boold' to ease a at il (c) Saudiyeh officials views, as given me by such persons as the son of Ibrahim bin Musmar, Saudi Minister in Baghdad, Al Nafici, and Ibn Shaja'an, Commander of Blookade Won's south of Kuwalt, ere that (1) the Imam Yahya is now definitely alarmed at the preparations of the King of Saudiyeh and has already asked for peace; (ii) that Hin Saud has informed him that he will only agree to discuss terms provided he, the Imam Yahya, pays him an amount equal to the money expended on the mobilization that has taken place, and that a definite and olear guarantee is given him that the Idrisi, now sheltering in Yemen, will be kept under proper control, no easeq ent drutato rentrut of bewolls ed for Illw bas Asir or Saudiyeh. to dilate edt mort gnitaname redtedw ,atroquer IIA (b) Kuwait, the tribes, or Saudi officials, definitely state that



"الملف 53/76 53/76) II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٧٨و]

- 3 -

state that no fighting of any sort has taken place between the rival forces up to the 15th November.

77 (78)

II. VISITORS.

The following prominent and other tribal visitors called on me during the period under review:-

Shunaif bin Hamud bin Abdulla al Sa'adun (Ex Riath, vide my confidential No.269, dated the 8th November 1933). 3rd November:

Aiyadh bin Hamdan, formerly employed by Major Glubb (said to be Anaze). 5th November:

13th November: Mohamed bin Hajaj

Ajman. Muraith bin Hawela)

15th November: Ghunaim bin Juraiyid. Dhafir.

19th November: Anad bin Mijlad, Dahamsha (Anaze).

26th November: Abdulla al Damir (senior).

Abdulla al Damir (his nephew) junior.

Both are Ajman exiles at the King of 'Iraq's

27th November: Juma bin Mohamed Yahya, 2nd driver of King Bin Saud's motor car. (On visit to his family residing Kuwait).

27th November:

Abdulla son of Ibrahim bin Mu'ammar, Saudi Minister in Baghdad. (Visiting his mother and sister residing in Kuwait, also his


father in Baghdad).

III. RAINS.

- (a) No rain has fallen in Kuwait upto the time of writing, except for a slight shower on 23rd November over the Dibdibba region west of the Shaqq depression, which was of no practical value.
- (b) On 24th November wireless reports from Salman Post in the 'Iraq southern Desert showed that heavy rain had fallen and was still falling over a wide area.
- (c) Bedouin reports received in Kuwait on 27th, stated that excellent rain had fallen west of the Batin in the 'Iraq Dibdibba region, and that as a result Ajemi al Suwait (Dhafir) and his following were moving there from the Hamatiyat region



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٧ ظ] (٣٣ ٢/١٦٢)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٧و] (٣٣٢/١٦٣)

region of the Shaqq.

(d) On 28th, 29th, 30th November saw heavy clouds over Kuwait town but no rain.


IV.ROYAL AIR FORCE SURVEY OF KUWAIT & KUWAIT NEUTRAL ZONE.

(99)

- (a) Major Papworth, R.E., Survey Officer to Royal Air Force Headquarters ('Iraq Command) resumed his survey of the Neutral Zone on 2nd November 1933, his assistant doing the same thing in the area on the north side of the Bay of Kuwait.
- (b) Both parties completed their work on 17th and 19th November respectively and returned to Shaiba.
- (c) Geptein Papworth was supplied with the usual guards and guides by His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait including hawkers with birds to provide the party with fresh game.
- (d) Major Papworth, as on the previous occasion when he visited Kuwait, made himself popular with everyone he came in contact with, and generally received high praise from the Shaikh for his tact and fair dealing with the Arab. His final departure from Kuwait was genuinely regretted by both the Ruler, and every Arab with whom he came in contact. The same may be said of the survey staff as a whole.
- (e) On 9th November and while Major Papworth was camped some 6 miles south of Jebel Banaiya (known as Al Diud, "the breasts", among the Bedouin) in the coastal region of the Huzaim (Neutral Zone), I heard from Al Nafisi, Bin Saud's Trade Agent in Kuwait, that a Saudi armed party under ibn Shaja'an had been sent by the King to protect the Survey Party and had arrived at and was camped at Wafra. I accordingly proceeded by car on 10th to Araifjan, camped there for night, and next day visited Major Papworth. After discussing with the latter Ibn Shaja'an's arrival and learning that he



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٩ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٠٠]

- 5 -

79 80

he had sufficient guards from the Shaikh of Kuwait to meet requirements, I proceeded to Ibn Shaja'ans camp at Wafra. The latter gave me a friendly reception and over a cup of coffee, I explained that Major Papworth was grateful to the King, his master, for the guard which had been sent, but was really in no need of same. I suggested that he and the guard should be withdrawn. Ibn Shaja'an thanked me but said that he must report to the Survey Party, as these were his orders. This he did next day, and inspite of Major Papworth repeating what I had said, Ibn Shaja'an remained a rather unwelcome guest till the 16th November when survey operations were closed down.

I myself returned to Kuwait on 12th November.

- (f) The Air Officer Commanding, 'Iraq Command visited Kuwait on 13th November and afterwards flew down to Major Papworth's camp where he spent the night.

 COMMENT. The visit of Ibn Shaja'an though outwardly a mark
- COMMENT. The visit of Ibn Shaja'an though outwardly a mark of Bin Saud's gracious consideration for Major Papworth's safety, had in my opinion two objects
 - (i) To watch certain Awazim sections camped in the Neutral Zone, who were suspected of running contraband from Kuwait into Hassa:
 - (b) To watch Major Papworth and see that he was not secretly boring for oil and general -ly conducting a geological survey.

Ibn Shaja'an, a Mutairi (of the Birzan Section) by origin, is known as one of Abdulla Ibn Jaloui's most cruel and heartless of butchers. It was chiefly due to his efforts that 5 blockade runners were executed in Hoffuf in October last (Vide Kuwait Summary, No.262, of 30th October, para II(4)(b) and III(b)).

V. RIATH NEWS AND WAR RUMOURS GENERALLY.

- 1. (a) On 20th November a report was current in Kuwait that a large ship load of arms and ammunition including fixed guns had arrived at Hodeida from Genoa for the use of the Yemen armies.
 - (b) A similar report said that two high Italian officers



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٠٠]

- 5 team of figure to dilade end mort sprain inelolitus bad ed .ariaw is gman ana'atada ndI of bebeecord I .ainemeriupar To quo a revo bna moitgeoer vibnein a em evas restal eff coffee, I emplained that Major Papworth was grateful to the mil ! King, his master, for the guard which had been sent, but was 过, braug edt bas ed fant befregges I .emes To been on at vilser should be withdrawn. Ibn Shaja'an thanked me but said that he han I must report to the Survey Party, as these were his orders. 181 10 This he did next day, and inspite of Major Papworth repeating what I had said, Ibn Shaja'an remained a rather unwelcome int the stew anoliarego yevrus medw redmevoN dial edi Illi jaeug the foll closed down. 1011. . redmevol dist no tlawest of bentuter lesym I (1) The Air Officer Commanding, 'Iraq Command visited intia notal of much well abrawled a bus redmevow dill no jiswull B1 7030 Papworth's camp where he spent the night. rored COMMENT. The visit of Ibn Shaja'an though outwardly a mark of Bin Saud's gracious consideration for Major Papworth's stoeldo owt nolniqo ym ni bad , ytelas beques anolises misswa mistres dojew of n the Neutral Zone, who were suspected from Kuwait into (d) To watch Major Papworth and see that he was not secretly boring for oil and general aurey. Ibn Shaja'an, a Mutairi (of the Birzan Section) by origin, is known as one of Abdulla Ibn Jaloui's most cruel atroffe aid of sub viletdo saw II .aredotud to aselfraed bus redotoO ni lulloH ni betusexe erew arennur eb misold & fadt hast (Vide Kuwait Summary, No. 282, of 30th October, para II(4)(b) and III(b)). V. RIATH NEWS AND WAR RUMOURS CHURRAILY. 1. (a) On 20th November a report was current in Kuwait that some beat gaibulent nothinums bus arms to beel quis egral s armies. (d) A similar report said that two high Italian officers




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٠]) (٣٣٢/١٦٧)

80 (81) - 5Aofficers had landed at Hodeida and proceeded to Sana. (c) On 23rd November the Shaikh of Kuwait reported that Bin Saud left for Mecca on 16th November and also that he had received a telegram from Aden to the effect that the opposing Saudi and Yemen forces were in contact just south of Sabiya in Asir, but that no shot had been fired. (d) On 24th news from Zubair said that telegrams received there reported fighting and a heavy reverse for Bin Saud. (The news was not credited locally.) The driver of Bin Saud's 2nd car, a Somali named Juma ibn Mohamed Yahya visited me on 26th November and reported the following interesting news, which I consider reliable: Juma's news is the more interesting as he is the NOTE. British subject registered in this Agency, who sometime back was rumoured to have been executed in Riath, but later was proved by H.M's Minister in Jedda to be safe. Juma's report was as follows:-He, Juma, left Riath on 15th November, by car, with Ibrahim bin Muammar's son. The previous day 16th November, Bin Saud had left Riath for Rukba (3 hours short of Taif) ostensibly to hunt gazelle, but in reality to visit Ataiba country en route and see what could be done to quiet that tribe which was said to be shaky and to have been got at by Imam Yahya. (See my Summary No.269, dated the 8th November, para 3(c). Bin Saud was accompanied by his sons, Mohamed and Khalid. Amir Saud gave out that he would follow his father on 22nd November. The King before leaving had stated that he would meet Amir Faisal, Philby and Abdulla bin Sulaiman (Finance) at Rukba. The King's brother Mohamed remained hunting north of Right




"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٠١] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٠] (٣٣٢/١٦٩)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٢]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٩] (٣٣٢/١٧١)

- 7 -



Juma related that he was himself present when they were removed from prison in Riath, a week

before the Shaikh of Qatar arrived at the Capital (1st September). The circumstances were as follows:-

(i) Six of Bin Jaloui's cars, 18 cylinder Buick, 4 lorries and 1 Chevrolet arrived at Riath from Hoffuf bringing Amir Faisal's wife (the grand-daughter of Ibn Jaloui).

(ii) Bin Saud seized opportunity of sending the following prisoners to Hoffuf in the cars:

Sultan ibn Humaid, Naif ibn Hathlein, Ibn Lami, 14 other Ataiba Shaikhs.

(iii) The greatest secrecy was observed during their removal, which took place at 11.30 P.M. All approaches to the prison were guarded, and drivers were forbidden to blow horns either in Riath or at Hoffuf on arrival.

(iv) The prisoners when brought out looked ill and worn, ibn Hathlain's left arm was still in splints, as result of beating he had received when he was suspected of having connived at the attempted escape of Ataiba Shaikh last Summer (reported).

(v) Cars left at midnight and made fast journey to Hoffuf under guard of 18 selected slaves of Ibn Jaloui - Chevrolet in front, 4 lorries in centre and big Buick in rear.

(vi) Convoy entered Hoffuf also at midnight in greatest secrecy and prisoners were placed in the KUT prison in underground dungeons.

(vii) Juma received details of journey from the Somali driver of the 18 cylinder Buick (his friend) who returned to Riath 8 days after, with Abdulla bin Thani, Shaikh of Qatar.

(viii) Juma was told by this driver that if prisoners were not secretly executed by Ibn Jaloui, as the Negro guards opined they would be, they could not long survive the dungeon life where no light penetrated at all.


(ix) Juma's views was that the King intended them to be secretly put away, and so had sent them to Bin Jaloui.

The above I believe to be the true story of the many contradictory rumours that have come up to Kuwait regarding the execution of the Riath prisoners. Nor do I think the latter had even a sporting chance, once they were transferred to the Amir of Hassa's unlovely hands.

VI./



"الملف 53/76 (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٣]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٩٥] (٣٣٢/١٧٣)

- 8 -

83 84

VI. PALESTINE EVENTS.

(a) On 24th November a letter, dated the 23rd of November and signed by the "SHABIRAT AL KUWAITIYEH" (Youngmen of Kuwait) was received by me. It read as follows:

Kuwait. 23.11.33.

To

The Political Agent, Kuwait.

In the name of the Merciful and Compassionate God, Whose help we seek.

After Compliments.

We, on behalf of all our old men and youngmen, and on behalf of our gentle women folk, beg to lay before Your Excellency this our sharp protest against His Majesty's Government's methods towards our brothers, the Arabs of Palestine, which no nation in the world, which considers itself just and impartial, as your Government, we know, does, could take any sort of pride in.

Indeed such treatment may also estrange the world from entering under your protection, which firstly we wish to see strong and secondly worthy. Be very sure that such unjust treatment will cause seventy millions of us Arabs, and three hundred and fifty millions of Mohammadans to bear you ill will, and await the hour of vengeance, for, verily everything has an end, and time will inevitably turn against the cruel.

We, in view of the rights Kuwait has upon you, and the consideration you have always shown her, shall thank you to refer this our protest to Your High Government.

Sd.Al Shabibat al Kuwaitiyeh.


warded it to His Excellency and enquired if he could tell me who the "Shabiba" were and whether such document had need he taken seriously, seeing that it bore no signature. His Excellency in reply advised me to treat it as a foolish effort on the part of some of his young people (he did not know who) and that I certainly need not to take any notice of a letter which had not come through him. I took his advice.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant,

Political Agent KUWAIT,




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٨٤]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٨٠] (٣٣٢/١٧٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٨ظ] (٣٣٢/١٧٦)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٠] (٣٣٢/١٧٧)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٦] (٣٣٢/١٧٨)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [۸۷]) (٣٣٢/١٧٩)

2697

No.3342/2/229.

British Legation,
Jedda,
Saudi Arabia.
7th December 1933.

Dear Dickson,


Ryan returns here on the 13th December so that my trick at the wheel in Jedda will soon be over. Before I do relinquish charge, however, I should like to let you know how greatly I have appreciated your very interest \$4 ing and informative Intelligence Summaries, in particular those sections relating to the tribes in Nejd, during the past summer. We here are only too conscious of our isolation and our remoteness from many of the important elements that go to make up the life of Saudi Arabia. Our information on such matters for example as Saudi relations with the Yemen comes largely from official sources, directly or indirectly, and we have naturally to guard against a too uncritical acceptance of what we are told. To keep a proper perspective, to apply the necessary correctives, we have to rely, to a considerable extent, on observations posts such as Kuwait and Aden. It has been of great interest to look into Arabia, so to speak, from Kuwait month by month with your eyes and I am personally most grateful to you for your reports.

I have tried to make my summaries, in the Jedda Report, as full as possible in regard to the situation with the Yemen. I quite realise of course, that they carry a certain Saudi official flavour with them.

With best wishes for Kmas and the New Year,
Yours sincerely,
SD. A.S.CALVERT.




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٠٠]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٨و] (٣٣٢/١٨١)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٨٨ظ] (٣٣٢/١٨٢)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٨و] (٣٣٢/١٨٣)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٨ظ] (٣٣٢/١٨٤)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٠] (٣٣٢/١٨٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٠٠] (٣٣٢/١٨٦)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩١] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩١] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٠] (٣٣٢/١٨٩)

No. 190/106/3 HIS Majesty's Minister of Jedda presents his compliments to The Hon'ble the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Rushire and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents. British. Legation. Jedda. 25th January 1934, 100.	
Name and Date.	f Enclosure. Subject.
To: Foreign Office. No. 20 of 25/1/34.	Sa'ûdi State prisoners. BUBHIRE REBORNCY AND 449 CONTIDEATIA ALGEBRA CONTIDEATIA ALGEBRA
3479 7650 (2)	




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٢] (٣٣٢/١٩٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٩و] (٣٣٢/١٩١)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٣]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٩ و] الملف 7/١٩٣)

93 (94) and so persistent as to suggest malicious invention or distortion of something that had happened. I was not myself, I said, ready to believe that the King would authorise the execution of men whose lives he had pledged himself to respect. On the contrary I was concerned, as a friend, for His Majesty's credit and preferred to inquire at once in that capacity rather than await instructions to investigate the matter as being one of legitimate interest to Mis Majesty's Government. 3. Fuad Bey reminded me, quite justly, that the King's pledge did not apply to Ibn Humaid (Sultan ibh Bujād) whose name I had mentioned with the others. He begged me to believe that the King was incapable of breaking his promise but he undertook to inquire into the facts. On January 10 he conveyed to me the King's assurance that The Limi and Ibn Hithlain were alive, and told me in reply to an inquiry, which I expressly put as a matter of curiosity, that Ibn Bujad was also slive. Having received in the meantime Col. Dickson's report for December, which cast doubt on the original murder story, I said to Fued Bey that I now had reason to believe that the three Sheykhs had been removed to Nofur and thought that this might have given rise to the first reports. Fund Bey promised to inquire further. On Jamary 24, when I reverted to the matter, he renewed the King's assurance that the men were alive but said that His Majesty begged to be excused, for




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٤] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٠٥] (٣٣٢/١٩٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٩٥] (٣٣٢/١٩٦)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٦] (٣٣٢/١٩٧)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٦] (٣٣٢/١٩٨)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٠] (٣٣٢/١٩٩)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٩٠] (٣٣٢/٢٠٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٩٠] (٣٣٢/٢٠١)

No.315/114/4. British Legation. PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL. Jedda, Saudi Arabia. 5th February 1934. - copy with My dear Dickson, Your letter No.D.O.C-7 of the 11th January to Calvert arrived here on February 4 by the steamer which took Calvert away on a well-deserved leave. He contemplates some rather complicated trekking so it may be some time before he sees your letter. I therefore acknowledge your kind offer of further assistance and I take the opportunity of saying how fully I share what Calvert said about the value of your monthly summaries to us here. One of my first tasks when I returned from leave was to read all those that I had not seen and I found them a mine of valuable information. We wrote to Bushire to express our thanks for your excellent answers to my questionnaire about trade, &c. We have not yet got down to the economic survey we had planned but we hope to start on it seriously in the near future. Nothing of the sort has been done since Ibn Saud roped the Hejaz into his dominions. At the moment the Saudi-Yemen situation continues to take up a great deal of our time. I should say that the chances of war or peace are now about fifty-fifty. The feature of the last month has been the tenseness of the situation in the mountain region northwest of Sa'ada. This has done more to excite the Saudis than any other recent phase. The King continues to send troops to the South. Among the more or less recent departures from Taif has been that of Ibn Rubaiyan and his 'Ateyba. Lt.-Colonel H.R.P.Dickson, C.I.E., Political Agent, KUWAIT.




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٩٨] (٣٣٢/٢٠٢)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٩و] (٣٣٢/٢٠٣)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٩٩٩] (٣٣٢/٢٠٤)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٠٠]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٠٠]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١و] "الملف 7/٢٠٧)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٠٨)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١٠] (٣٣٢/٢٠٩)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٣] (٣٣٢/٢١١)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠١ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١٠] (٣٣٢/٢١٣)

always hope to get something in November, but this Winter, except for a few drops, which merely freshened things up, no rain fell till 3rd of February. On that date a depression would appear to have formed in North East Arabia and to have moved up into southern 'Iraq, and along the Eupherates valley. Kuwait got a drizzle on 3rd February, another drizzle on 5th February and one whole-day of good rain (over ginch) on the 9th February. Southern and middle 'Iraq including the desert area south of the Eupherates and in North Kuwait did very much better from all accounts.


(b) South of Kuwait, especially in the Hassa zone,

- (b) South of Kuwait, especially in the Hassa zone, the Summan region (Mutair Country) and central and south central Nejd the rains have failed entirely except for a shower or two reported from the AL JUDA area north west of Hoffuf and the SUDA region on the coast north of Jubail.
- (c) From the northern Bedouin point of view this "Blessing of God" has relieved what promised to be a very serious situation indeed. Everywhere grass is coming up well, west of the Batin valley, and moderately well in the Principality of Kuwait. The Northern portion of Kuwait has fared better than the southern, but even so the "arfaj" bush has burst into bloom, and grass is appearing everywhere. More rain however is wanted in Kuwait if the new grass is not to wither up and die. Only a trifle over the table of the table of the southern and the southern are rainfall should reach 30" to 4".
- (d) Speaking generally 'Iraq and the Southern 'Iraq desert has had very good rains; Kuwait, moderate rains; Hail and Jebel Shammar, moderate rains; inner Nejd and Hassa, none at all.
- (e) This means that while the 'Iraq camel and shepherd tribes have been well provided for, things are going to be difficult for the Kuwait Bedouin (unless more rain falls) and very serious indeed for the tribesof Nejd and Hassa.

 The latter must migrate up to 'Iraq and Kuwait in search



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١٤]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٠٠]

104(05)

- 3 -

search of "Hayat" (life) as they have already been doing throughout February in large numbers, and nothing will induce them to go south again into reasonable Nejd unless rain falls in the interior, however much Bin Saud thunders. For the Bedouin, therefore, the situation is fraught with anxiety.


II. TRIBAL MOVEMENTS ETC.

- (a) <u>Kuwait tribes</u> (Fidawiyeh and Araibdar) under the Amir Haif bin Hajraf (Ajman), who throughout December and January were camped in the Ab-al-Hiran, Safa and Hamatiyat areas (Garaa Region) between the Musannat ridge and the Shaqq depression, gradually moved north with the advent of the rains and by the end of February settled themselves in the Hauma and Shiggat al Ruwaisat districts in the North West corner of the Principality. They now water their camels at Hauma and Aglat ibn Sigai wells.
- Juma, IbnAtrama, Rai-al-Fahama) practically the whole tribe both camel and sheep sections, moved up from Hassa during February in one vast migration to the northern portion of Kuwait grazing. By the end of the month the vanguard consisting of vast numbers of camels and tents had reached the area north-west of the Liyah ridge at Um-al-Ruwaisat, came into touch with the Kuwait tribes; the rear guard, consisting of the slower moving sheep section were echeloned back as far south as Subaihiyeh on the southern border.

 The above now water at Jahara, Subaihiyeh and Tawil wells.
- (c) Bani Khalid (Salah bin Abdulla) behind the Awazim moved up several section of the aristocratic Bani Khalid nomads. These normally live roundabout Qatif and Jubail. The end of February saw some 60 tents of the tribe in the Kuwait Neutral Zone. They water at Wafra.
- (d) <u>Mutair</u> (Ilwa and Wasil) have practically all moved north-west across the Batin valley and by the end of February were echeloned from the 'Iraq Dibdibba region and the Tawal al Dhafir ('Iraq Neutral Zone) in the North down/



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٠ ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١٠] (٣٣٢/٢١٧)

- 4 -

down to Al Thamami in the south. Several sections notably the followers of AI Fuqm and others are now camped in the south west angle of Kuwait. The Mutair water from the 'Iraq Neutral Zone, Hafar al Batin, and Bashuk well area. Naif al Maziad (official leader of the Mutair Ilwa) is at Artawiyeh, with al Hamaidi son of Faisal al Duwish.

Mashari ibn Musaiyis, Nazil al Musaiyis and other "Wasil" leaders (ERAH) were camped at Thamami at the end of February.


- (e) Harb (Al Firm) in the Bashuk region are echeloned westward from Thamami towards Hail.
- (f) Shammar more or less follow the grazing grounds of the Harb, though many are to be found in the 'Iraq Neutral Zone (Tawal al Dhafir) and the Hajira region, 'Iraq southern Desert.
- (g) Ajman. Numbers of tents belonging to no particular section are scattered over the Kabd, Um Junaiyib and ADAN regions, south and southwest of Kuwait and are slowly moving north after the Awazim. This great tribe has remained completely disorganized ever since the Akhwan rebellion of 1930-31 was put down by Bin Saud when the principal leaders fled to Baghdad and only the southern sections under Ibn Munaikhir, Ibn Mikrad etc. remained loyal to the King. Shaikh Rakan, the son of the murdered Dhaidan al Hathlain, the last great Shaikh of the Ajman, is not yet old enough to take a leading part in the tribe, and besides which he is kept under perpetual surveillance at Riath.
- 2. In discussing these tribal movements, it should be realized that each of the above tribes have all sent contingents to the "Yemen War", some in greater proportion to others. For instance the Mutair (Ilwa) have sent all their Shaikhs except Faisal al Duwish's younger son, Al Humaidi, Naif ibn Maziad (official Shaikh) and the Braih Shaikhs Ibn Jarbua, Ibn Ashwan, Ibn Shuwaribat, with their paramount Shaikh Mashari bin Musaiyis, while the Awazim have sent a comparatively small contingent of not more than

400/

105 (106)




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١٠]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١٠] (٣٣٢/٢١٩)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٠٣]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٨] (٣٣٢/٢٢١)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" (١٠٨ظ)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٩] (٣٣٢/٢٢٣)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠٩ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١٠]

109(10) - 8 do not mention this. It stands to reason however tha once in Kuwait territory they will all certainly "Sabil" to Kuwait in their thousands and as soon as possible. Nothing can prevent this. So until rains in the south cause Bin Sauds tribes to return to their homes once more we may expect to see full "Musabilah" take place between the Awazim, Ajman, Bani Khalid, and a large part of the Mutair with Kuwait. In other words March 1934 should see the Blockade broken and set at naught by Bin Saud's northeastern tribes for the first time in 10 years. This is all to the good from Kuwait's point of view, while thousands of desperately poor tribal folk will at long last be able to buy from their ancestral market town, instead of being forced to go far south to Jubail, Qatif and Hoffuf for their necessities of mlife. "Verily the stars in their courses are", in the words of an old Ajman Shaikh, "fighting against Abdul Aziz al Saud". IV. VISITORS. The following prominent and other tribal visitors called on me during the period under review: La'afi ibn Ma'alath, one of the Shaikhs of Brain (Mutair) at present a fugitive from (a) 2.234. Saudiyeh. (b) 8.2.34. Fahad bin Ma'alath, Aced bin Ma'alath, La'afi bin Ma'alath. (c) 21.2.34. Juma bin Maktum, brother of the Shaikh of Dubai. (d) 27.2.34. Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo, C.I.E., of Bahrain. (e) 28.2.34. Saleh bin Abdulla of the Beni Khalid. NOTE. (i) Shaikh La'afi bin Ma'alath (a) above is a famous Mutair warrior, and bears a great name as a fighter. For his troubles with H.M.King Abdul Aziz see Kuwait Summary No.182, dated the 10th August.32 Taking advantage of the northern migrations mentioned above, Shaikh Latafi managed to get a message through to his brother to get his women folk secretly out of the Mutair country into Kuwait. This was done and his



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٠ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٢٦)

eono ad Tevewod nosaer of chada tl . ald noitnem ton of Sauds tribes to return to their homes once more was edf ees bloom acel dorsk skrow redfo ol . flawon ditw to buy from their ancestral market town, instead of being IV. VISITORE. (b) 8.2.54. Fahad bin Ma'eloth, .drs.fa'aM nid lia'al (0) 21.2.34. (d) 27.2.34. Yusuf bin Almed Manoo, C.I.S., of Bahrein. (e) 28.2.54. Saleh bin Abdulla of the Bent Khalid. NOTE. (1) shaikh le'afi bin Ma'alath (a) above is a femous Mutair warrior, and bears a great name as a fighter. For his troubles with H.M.King Abdul Aziz see Kuwait Summary Mo.182, dated the 10th August. of the Mutair country into Nuwsit. This was done and his



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١١و] "الملف 7/٢٢٧)

- 9 -

and his two brothers Aeed and Fahad accompanied the ladies.
They are
There all camped near Jahara prior to going into 'Iraq at
the end of January and were visited by the writer on 10th

W9 (11)

(ii) In addition to the above, the family (ladies) of the Shaikh of Sharja visited Kuwait on 14th February 1934 en route to the Hejaz (Haj). They left by the land route on 22nd February 1934.

V. HAJ.

February.

- (a) The Kuwait camel Haj (trans-desert) left the Town between the 10th and 15th February. Not more than 300 persons left this year, as there was a general feeling of nervousness regarding the outcome of the Saudi Yemen trouble.
- (b) A few cars also left for Riath from Kuwait with certain prominent lady members of the Naqib of Basra's family, en route to Mecca, but this was done by special permission.
- (c) In reply to a telegraphic query from certain Zubair notables to Bin Saud, as to whether they could go to the Haj in cars via Kuwait and Riath, the King replied and told them to refer to his Minister of Finance, Abdulla ibn Sulaiman, who would tell them of the fees that would have to be paid. This subsequently turned out to be £.T.2 per head.


VI.RIATH NEWS AND WAR RUMOURS GENERALLY.

Up to the end of February the principal topic of conversation in Kuwait has been the situation in the Asir - Yemen front.

- 2. Many wild stories continue to come through, which all take a good deal of sifting.
- 3. As always is the case in Kuwait and especially among the tribal elements, persons hostile to Bin Saud have never/



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١١ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٢٨)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٠و] "الملف 7/٢٢٩)


- 10 -

never tired of spreading tales of the Kings difficulties, while conversely his Trade Agent and certain Nejd subjects residing here, have regularly tried to spread equally false news in favour of their Master.

- 4. At the end of January a particularly clear and circumstantial story (which was also confirmed from separate Mutair sources) was brought into Kuwait by one of Bin Sauds Ajman messengers (ex Riath on 13th January). This was to the effect that Saaiyid al Faisal, a negro commander of some of Bin Sauds advanced troops had made a sudden and treacherous attack on a force of some 1000 of Yahya's army in the vicinity of Badr (Nejran). The attack had been successful and 700 of Yahya's men had been slain.
- 5. The occurrence took place, it was said, during the truce when full peace negotiations were proceeding, and after Bin Saud had issued stringent orders to his generals that no offensive move whatsoever was to be made anywhere.
- 6. As a result of the incident Yahya at once broke off peace conversations and ordered his armies to prepare immediately to take the offensive.
- 7. Bin Saud in vain dismissed Saajiyid al Faisal and telegraphically expressed his profound regrets, but for some days the Imam Yahya refused to be appeased.
- 8. Bin Saud, believing war was inevitable, sent his son Saud on 11th January post haste to Ebha with all available troops still in Riath (800 men) in light Ford lorries with orders to take supreme command. With the Amir Saud went Khalid bin Mohemed as Saud and Fahad bin Sa'ad al Saud.
- 9. The above story though promptly denied in Bahrain and elsewhere nevertheless obtained full evidence in Kuwait, seeing that it had been brought in by one of the King's most trusty messengers. Even the Shaikh of Kuwait, hithertop cautious, was inclined to believe the story and attached special significance to the departure of the Heir Apparent for the front.
 - 10. On 5th February further news from Riath



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٢ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٣٠)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٠] (٣٣٢/٢٣١)

112 613 - 11 -Riath (this time tribal) arrived to the effect that Bin Saud had at last been successful in persuading Yahya that Sa'aiyid al Faisal's action had been entirely against his orders, and after expressing deep regret, had been able to restore the situation. The report further had it that Yahya's troops had pursued and surrounded Sa'aiyid al Faisal': force after their victory and in turn had captured the whole party, and it was this success on top of the Kings apologies that had turned the scales in favour of peace once more. This fresh report also had it that the original figure at 700 was incorrect and the true figurewas 300 killed by Sataiyidts men. 11. Peace negotiations were thereupon once again started and had continued till the end of February with varying success. 12. On 14th February the Shaikh of Kuwait reported that fresh news from Riath had it that Bin Saud had ordered all the camels of his Asir expeditionary force to return to the highlands of Nejd, as there was an insufficiency of grazing in Asir. Such an order, if true, said His Excellency, would also serve the purpose of preventing mass desertions from the front of which many had been reported especially from the Ataiba tribe. 13. On 19th February the Shaikh reported that according to a Bedouin messenger from Artawiyeh a sharp fight had taken place near Ebha between the Mutair and the Harb tribal contingents of the King. The Harb had been victorious at first and had killed 22 Mutairis, but subsequently the Ataiba came to the help of the Mutair, and turned the tables on the Harb. This interfaction fighting in the King's army had only been stopped after the Amir Saud had personally intervened. 14. On 27th February K.B. Abdul Latif bin Abdul Jalil, ex-Director of Customs, Kuwait, arrived from Riath (he had gone there on 9th February). He brought (a) A personal and very friendly letter from




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٣]

tent ti bad redrut tropor edT .no itautie edt eroteer ot .erom some some to rever ni eslace edt bemret bad tadt 11. Peace negotiations were thereupon once again varying success. betroger tlawelt to dalade est yearset still no .31 Excellency, would also serve the purpose of preventing contingents of the King. The Harb had been victorious at ent ni entingil noitoslient aidl .draH edt no seldat . Ilist lubda nid tital lubda. H. N. apride's nive no . M. ex-Director of Customs, Kuwait, arrived from Hath (he had




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٠١٠ق] "الملف





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٤ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٣٤)





"الملف 53/76 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٥٠ و] (4 4 / 4 4 0)

- 13 -

16. His Excellency was still of the opinion (expressed repeatedly since the commencement of the strained relations) that there would/no war and that some sort of a settlement would be arrived at somehow in the end, but that it would be disadvantageous to Bin Saud.

17. The crux of the situation lay, said the Shaikh, round the Idrisi: Yahya wanted Bin Saud to give the Idrisi a small slice of Asir to reside in under his (Yahya's) guarantee of good behaviour, while Bin Saud wanted

- (a) Either the surrender (unconditionally) of the Idrisi, or that Yahya should keep him (Idrisi) under surveillance in some town in the interior of Yemen, he (Bin Saud) paying him a salary.
- (b) That Yahya should pay him (Bin Saud) the total cost of maintaining his army in the field, calculated at approximately 10/- S. a day per man, from the day trouble began.

18. The above conditions (17) were brought by K.B. Abdul Latif, who according to his own statement, had got them from the King himself. They are of course quoted for what they are worth. No doubt H.M's Minister at Jedda has the true facts at his disposal.


19. According to the same source (K.B.Abdul Latif) the King was at his wits end for money, and hoped against hope that His Majesty's Government would still loan him a lump sum down to see him through his difficulties. "Now was the time for Great Britain to show whether her friendship was all a sham, or a true and loyal one", is said by the worthy Khan Bahadur to have been quoted to him by the King.

VII. AN AJMAN SHAIKH'S DREAM.

As an instance of the deep resentment and hostility which Bin Saud has managed to work up amongst the tribes of Nejd against himself, notably emongst the Ajman, Mutair and Ataiba, the following story may be found of interest. It certainly is a pretty study in the psychology of the Bedouin.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٥]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١١و] (٣٣٢/٢٣٧)

- 14 -


On 15th February a certain agedAJMAN tribesman, (whose name shall be unmentioned) chief of a small section, in discussing with me the possibilities of peace or war in the Yemen, gave it as his firm opinion that the days of Bin Saud were numbered. "God", said he, "could no longer tolerate his misdoings and his harsh treatment of the Arabs and Musalmin. I know that what I say is right because ten nights ago I dreamed a dream, and these sorts of dreams do not lie". On my enquiring what his dream was, he related the following (his words, as close as possible).

"I dreamed that I was in my small date grove at N'ta in Hassa, and was sleeping peacefully one afternoon by the side of one of the springs of water that exist there. It was midday and the heat of early Summer had made me sleepy. Suddenly I woke up on feeling something crawling over my legs. In my dream I jumped up and saw that it was a viper which had disturbed me. I seized my stick and tried to kill it shouting loudly for help to my uncle lying in his tent close by. As I struck I wounded the snake only in the tail, and as I was about to strike again, behold, it lifted up its voice and spoke to me in man's tongue. I lay spellbound, and the snake said, "Why, 0: do you hurt me, who would save you. I am no enemy but a friend. I am the vengeance of God. Let me depart in peace and you will live to bless me, for I come to kill your uncle who would destroy you". Spellbound I dreamed that I awoke, and straightway (still in my dream) I went to our tribal priest (Mutawaa) andasked him to interpret my dream. The priest after hearing my story said, "Oh, this is the interpretation of thy dream: You are the people of Nejran, the Yam your blood brothers, the snake is Yahya, Lord of Yemen. Yahya on his way to slay the great Bin Saud passed

115(116)



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١١٣]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٧] (٣٣٢/٢٣٩)

116 (17) - 15 passed by you and you tried to kill him. He meant you no harm. You shouted and appealed for help to your uncle. He is Abdul Aziz al Saud, related to you in truth by blood and family ties, but nevertheless your enemy who would encompass your destruction. You did well to let the snake go, for verily he is God's vengeance and will now carry out His work". After this I woke, and knew that I had seen the coming death of the King, or at least his discomfiture. We, Ajman, are believers in dreams, and should a priest tell us anything in our dreams, it is a sure sign that what he says will come to pass. Bin Saud's days are numbered and great woe is coming over the land". When the Bedouin of Arabia start dreaming dreams in the true old Testament styple, and when these are passed from man to man and are believed, like the sayings of the prophets of old, then things begin to happen. VIII. OIL INTERESTS. On 15th February 1934, Mr. Chisholm and Major F. Holmes, representing the newly formed Kuwait Oil Company, an amalgamation of the "A.P.O.C." and "Gulf Oil Co.," of America (Mellon Group) arrived in Kuwait. On 22nd February 1934, Messrs Chisholm and Holmes presented to His Excellency the Shaikh of Kuwait two copies of the Draft Oil Agreement which they hope to get His Excellency's approval to in due course. I have the honour to be. Sir. Your most obedient servant, Arcum · Lt.-Colonel, Political Agent, Kuwait VSS.




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٧ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٤٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١١٨] "الملف 7/٢٤٨)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" (١١٨ظ) (٣٣٢/٢٤٢)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٩ او] "الملف 7/٢٤٣)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٩٩ ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠١ و] "الملف 7/٢٤٥)

- 2 -


119(20)

remarkable dust-storm over the whole of Kuwait principality which in parts was so thick, as to resemble a London fog at its worst. His Excellency the Shaikh who was out hunting together with many Bedouin coming up to Kuwait lost their way completely, and were unable to make for Kuwait for 20 hours. Eleven motor cars carrying passengers to various spring camps of Kuwait residents in the South were also fogbound for a day and night.

- (c) Following the dust-storm a depression which seems to have formed somewhere in the direction of JAUF Casis started moving towards the Batin region and reached the Bay of Kuwait on 1st April. There was violent thunder and lightening throughout the night of the 2nd, and day of 3rd April, which culminated in a widespread downpour of rain. This lasted the best part of 15 hours. The depression then moved South-East into the Persian Gulf and apparently again struck the Arabian shore at Bahrain where the Royal Air Force reported stormy weather and rain on 7th April.
- (d) The whole of the Northern and Central portion of Kuwait got copious rain, but the extreme southern border got nothing, nor as far as can be gathered did North Hassa or any part of Bin Saud's territory in the interior. Kuwait Town's share was 47 cents, but very much more fell in the interior especially to the North and West of the Principality
- (e) The above "Blessing of God", to use the language of the Bedouin, has been/the greatest value. Kuwait Principality has now got all it wants and the wild grasses such as "arfaj", "Nassi" and "Hamth" are everywhere coming out in profusion. Though the above rain is abnormally late it has come just in time to save the grazing which everywhere was shrivelling and drying up after only la" growth. It is now expected that before the Summer heat finally comes on, the Desert hay crop and wild grass will have reached an average height of at least a foot, which will safely see the Nomad population through the coming Summer.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠١ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢١ او] "الملف 7/٢٤٧)

- 3 -

- (f) The interior of Nejā from all accounts has had no rain at all, and the prospects of the Bedouin there are bad indeed.
- (g) Hassa Province got a small fall of rain on 5th March, according to reports received from an Imperial Airways pilot, but this is said to have only touched the fringe of the trouble, and was confined, as far as one can ascertain, to a few miles of the coastal region between Jubail and Qatif. Inland there was nothing.
- (h) For a person who has not lived in the desert and among the Bedouin of Arabia, it is difficult to imagine the delirious joy with which the above rain was greated by the Nomad population, with their vast flocks of sheep and herds of camels. A sense of joy, well being and hope in the future, today pervades the whole countryside and affects the Town population equally with the Desert.
- (i) According to old established custom/ the writer called on the Ruler on 5th April and congratulated him on the rain, and the "Blessing" which God had vouched on his country and people.
- (j) The next two months should see the cost of butter, wool, meat, firewood and the necesséities of life generally come down with a run.

III. TRIBAL MOVEMENTS.


At the time of writing the following tribes (Kuwait and Nejd) are located as under.

- (a) Kuwait Nomads. (Araibdar and Fidawiyeh), under the Amir Haif bin Hajraf (Ajman) are camped in the North-West corner of the Principality and are scattered over the regions known as Um al Madafa and Um as-Shaham. They drink from "Khabaris" (lakelets) which have everywhere formed as a result of the rains of 2nd and 3rd April.
- (b) AWAZIM. (Followers of Ibn Jama, Ibn Khafra, Ibn Atrama, Rai al Fahama) are practically all camped East of the Jahara-Safwan road, North of the Bay of Kuwait. A few of their

120 (21)




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" (٢١ ظ] "الملف 7/٢٤٨)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٢ او] (٣٣٢/٢٤٩)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٢ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٣]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٣ ١ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠١و] "الملف 7/٢٥٣)

123 (124) - 6 from Kuwait across the Nejd border; but blockade running is on the increase and a marked deterioration in the measures taken to stop the traffic has set in. This, no doubt, is due to the Bin Saud - Yemen troubles, which have demoralized in large measure the King's officials along the Northern frontier. (c) On the 25th March the writer met Hamud al Bagaawis wife travelling with two other women in the desert, and had an interesting talk with her on matters to do with blockade. She had been staying with the Amir Haif ibn Hajraf, and was returning to her husband after a lengthy absence. (d) It is reliably reported that the aged Faisal ibn Shuqair (uncle of Trahib, the Shaikh of the section) desiring to put himself rightwith Bin Saud Mo bringing the Jerriya Mutair into Kuwait, recently proceeded to Riath, and got a telegram sent to the King from there, to the effect that the Mutair had entered Kuwait purely because "death" lay behind them and life "Al Haya" (the Bedouin equivalent for life) was in the North. The King replied at once, also by telegram that he had no objection to the whole of the Mutair doing so, as well as other Hassa tribes. (Authority: The wife of Shaikh Riddan as Sur of the Suwara Section of the Mutair, who, on behalf of her husband visited the writer on 25.3.34 and again on 7.4.34). This is satisfactory as far as it goes. (e) A curious but unconfirmed report reached Kuwait on 20th March to the effect that the 'Iraq Government had appointed a certain Shammar tribesman named Sudaid al Sham to try and deal with certain 'Iraqi smugglers, who, with great boldness were conducting their operations between Kuwait, Kerbela and Nejef. It was said that Sudair had been given the equivalent of Rs.5,000/- per annum, and had to produce and maintain a party of 60 horsemen and camelmen with the money.




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٠١ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٥] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٥ اظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٦ او] (٣٣٢/٢٥٧)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٦ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 155 (II (D 155) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٧] والملف 7/٢٥٩)

- 9 over the Liyah - Dikaka - Hawma, Shigage and Um al Madefa area. (c) The camps of the following leading Mutran, Bani Khalid, Rashaida and Ajman Shaikhs were visited: 1. Majid al Asgar (Mutair)
Ridden as Sur
Farhan ibn Khudhaiyir (Kuwait Mutair)
Al Jazi (Mutairi wife of the late Shaikh Mubarak
of Kuwait). 2. Saleh al Nimran Addas al Nimran (Rashaida) Ibn Swelim (Bani Khalid) 3. Ibn Mendil 4. Haif bin Hajraf Nahar al Mutalaqim Obeid al Mutalaqim (Ajman) (d) Many Awazim, Adwan, Zab, Rushaida and Mutair tents were seen, as well as a few Sbei, Qahtan and Sahool tribesmen. In fact the writer has rarely seen such a mass concentration of Bedouin in Kuwait. (e) All complained of the hardships they had undergone South, and all praised the grazing they had found in Kuwait. (f) Two things impressed the writer during these tours (which covered a distance of close on \$50 miles): 1. The general nervousness of the Nejd tribes and the way they attempted to hide their identity by every means in their power: The general underground tension and excitement which seemed to pervade the whole atmosphere. As regards (1): I learned Iter both from the tribal ladies mentioned in para V above and from the Shaikh of Kuwait that they thought I was about to order them (Nejd tribes) to return across the Southern border into Neja again, and so every person attempted to escape my notice and hide the identity of his Chief or section by every known subterfuge. This would have been amusing had it not been sad. All had 1 clearly suffered at the hands of Bin Saud, and many showed signs of hunger and starvation, more especially the Mutair. They, one and all, certainly feared that I was about to evict them. I did my best to reassure them. As regards (2) above: Although my last tour among these



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٧ ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٨ او] "الملف 7/٢٦١)

- 10 -

these Nejd tribes was on 25th March, all of them appeared to be perfectly well aware that hostilities had broken.out between their master and Yahya in far off Yemen. This was the more strange seeing that the official news only reached Kuwait on 26th March in the shape of a telegram from the Hon'ble the Political Resident who was at Bahrain. The effect of the news on the tribes was that the "smaller fry", almost under my eyes, began to close in on their ShaikhS tents, and the latter in turn to concentrate into groups; for example the Mutair, Rushaida, Adawin, Zab, Bani Khalid started grouping themselves in the Western half of the Principality, along the Batin, while the strong Awazim (enemies of the Mutair) started moving to the Eastern side of the Kuwait-Safwan road.

It was all very striking and quite patent that should Bin Saud suffer a serious reverse or ever go under the Nejd tribes will at once fly at each others throats and the days of the blood feud will once more prevail. "Verily", as one Shaikh said, "the Bedouin's hand is against everyman, and everyman's hand is against him". And more than ever is it clear that Bin Saud's strong arm alone prevents "chaos" among his people.

VII. RIATH NEWS AND THE WAR IN YEMEN.


On 24th March. The Shaikh of Kuwait received a mysterious and unsigned telegram from Eaghdad to the effect that war had broken out between Bin Saud and Yahya and that the formers forces had invaded Yemen territory.

On 26th March the Hon'ble the Political Resident from Bahrain informed the writer (quoting a telegram from Jedda) that negotiations had been broken off between Bin Saud and Yahya.

On 5th April the following telegram was received by the Shaikh of Kuwait from Ibn Muammar, Saudian Minister at Baghdad, which in itself was curious as the Shaikh has never had correspondence or communication with the person named:




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٨ ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٩] (٣٣٢/٢٦٣)




On the 26th March 1934 and taking advantage of the 'Id Holidays, the Mutasarrif of Basra, Tahsin Beg Ali, accompanied by Dr. Ibrahim Akif Alusi, Director of Health, Basra Sami Beg, Accountant General Basra; Abdul Wahab al Naama, Deputy Director of Customs; Abdul Jabbar Khaderi, merchant; Nuri Thabit, Journalist; Mr. Gabriel, Lawyer (Shaikh's), paid a purely private visit to Kuwait. The Shaikh who was in camp with his family placed his Palace at the disposal of the party.

The Shaikh, it seems, did not invite the above guests in the first place, but in answer to an urgent personal message from the Mutasarrif that he would like to run down and see Kuwait, the Shaikh enswered that he was



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٩ ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠٠] (٣٣٢/٢٦٥)

- 12 -

129

was welcome to do so, provided he came unofficially.

The Mutasarrif and party left again on 28th March 1934, after mutual calls had been exchanged between him and the Political Agent.

In the opinion of the writer, the Mutasarrif's visit had something to do with 'Iraq's anti-smuggling policy.

The Mutasarrif certainly made of public remarks as to the unwisdom of accusing Kuwait, when his own country was entirely to blame.


VIII. OIL INTERESTS.

- (a) On 17th March the Shaikh reported that the American Geologists working in Hassa had reached AL HANDIA wells 15 miles South-East of 'NTA. They were moving from water to water and camping at each lot of wells for 7 and 8 days at a time.

 He said that he had heard that another party had gone South to Jabrin Casis from Hoffuf.
- (b) The Representatives of the Kuwait Oil Company are at the time of writing still engaged in trying to get their concession out of the Shaikh. It is understood that matters are going as satisfactorily as can be expected, and it is hoped before very long that a pronouncement of a satisfactory nature will be made. In the meantime negotiations are carried on in very friendly manner.
- (c) It is understood that what is holding up the final phase of the story is the Shaikh's insistence on having his own representative on the Board of Directors in London and his further insistence that the Company should pay him an export tax of 4 annas per every ton of Oil leaving the country. The Company appear to be raising difficulties in the matter.
- (d) The United/Minister at Baghdad paid a visit to Kuwait from 28th to 30th March. He stayed with the Political Agent and while disclaiming any interest in 0il, put several pointed questions to Major Holmes regarding the "Red Line" Agreement and Kuwait falling within the same.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠٠ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣١٠] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"

180 (131) (a) On 7th the writer learned that the German Minister at Baghdad, and the French Charge' d'Affaires, accompanied by their respective wives and the Hon'y French Consul at Basra, hoped to visit Kuwait for two days on 7th and 8th April. Later. In spite of a telegram being sent that there was no accommodation, the party arrived on 8th April, spent 6 hours in Kuwait and left again for Basra by car. They were shown round the Town by the writer who was struck by their knowledge of the place and its history, and especially by certain pointed questions regarding Oil developments that were made by Dr. Grobba, the German Minister. IX. IMPERIAL AIRWAYS. (a) The Eastbound aircraft which arrived at Kuwait on 5th April was seriously damaged by a sudden and sharp squall which rising from nothing in a few seconds, struck her as she was refuelling on the ground. Her left top wing was badly ripped, before steps could be taken to get the machine head on to the wind. (b) A breakdown Hannibal arrived on the 6th April from Cairo with spares, mechanics, etc., but more material will have to be brought from London. relief (breakdown) aircraft after a delay of 24 hours, during which they were put up by the Political Agent and A.P.O.C. representative. (d) The damaged machine will probably be some 15 days in Kuwait, as the repairs to be done are extensive. (e) The Political Agent erected a large tent on the aerodrome for the party, placed the Agency at the disposal of the officers, as well as supplied blankets, bread, water, baths etc. etc. for the members of the crew.

I have the honour to be, Your most obsdient servant TRP Dreum Lt.-Colonel, Political Agent, Kuwait




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣١ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٢ او] "الملف 73/76)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٢ ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣ او] "الملف 7/٢٧١)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣ اظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٤ او] "الملف 7/٢٧٣)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٤ ط] (٣٣ ٢/٢٧٤)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٥٠و] "الملف 7/٢٧٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٥ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٦١و] (٣٣٢/٢٧٧)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٦ ظ] (٣٣ ٢/٢٧٨)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٧ او] "الملف 7/٢٧٩)

NOTE ON THE SHAMMAR TRIBE, JEBEL SHAMMAR And the Ibn Rashid dynasty of Hail now in abeyance.

Jebel Shammar is the Northern Province of Saudi Arabia, its capital Hail the focal point of the Shammar Tribal Confederation, and was long ruled over by the Al or Bani Rashid family, now scattered and living in exile.

History, prior to the nineteenth century, of the
 Jebel Shemmar and its politics is meagre.


The Al Sa'ud, the Royal family of Saudi Arabia, maintain that the Ibn Rashid dynasty, rulers of Hail in the nineteenth century, were petty chieftains placed in power by them as the governing family of Jebel Shammar. However they came to power they were at least often rebellious and finally drove out the Al Sa'ud, whose survivors fled to Kuwait. There they remained as refugees brooding over their fate just as the remainder of the Bani Rashid, now living under supervision in Saudi Arabia and scattered must do today; having themselves been driven out in turn by the Al Sa'ud. It is conceivable that the Bani Rashid dynasty will one day be revived and rule again at Hail.

position today of increasing interest, situated as it is beneath what would be the shortest air route between Egypt and Kuwait or Bahrain. It is now too late and perhaps would be valueless, even if it were possible, to complete our information for the early years of the Rashid dynasty but it is not too late to fill in gaps which exist in more recent histroy. It is the object of this note to fill those gaps.

2./



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [۳۷ ظ] (٣٣ ٢/٢٨٠)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٨٠و] "الملف 7/٢٨١)

- 2 -

Geographical and Statistical.

J.G.Lorimer's "Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, page 1752 and after of Volume II Geographical and Statistical" has a complete note on the country but no map to show the extent of the Bani Rashid power at its greatest.

Notes for a map will therefore be found attached giving (a) the boundaries of the country under the rule of the Bani Rashid and (b) the Shammar grazing grounds and labelled "A".

The description at page 1750 of the Gazetteer has a note on the tribal divisions of the Shammar but it is incomplete. A complete table of the whole Shammar Confederation will be found below labelled "B". The information was collected from Shammar Shaikhs.

Historical.

J.G.Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Volume I, Historical, page 1161 and after has a "Separate History of the Jebel Shammar Principality of Northern Najā", but this stops at January 1907. The Admiralty Handbook on Arabia carries on the story into the time of the Great War. A continuation of the History, based on information in Philby's "Arabia", from then until the fall of Hail in 1921 will be found below, labelled "C".

Genealogical.


Lorimer's Gazetteer Volume I, part 3, Genealogical Tables, has in pocket 14 a pedigree of the Al Rashid (Shammar) family of Jebel Shammar but this now requires bringing up to date.

The pedigree brought up to date, from information supplied by members of the Rashid family and Shammar tribesmen, will be found below, labelled "D".

137(38)



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٨ ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٩ او] "الملف 7/٢٨٣)

"A".

NOTES FOR A MAP TO SHOW (a) THE EXTENT OF THE RASHID TERRITORY AT ITS GREATEST AND (b) THE PRESENT SHAMMAR GRAZING GROUNDS AND LINES OF ANNUAL MIGRATION.

(a) Extent of the Rashid Territory, etc.

West.

To include the Wadi Sirhan as far as Kaf inclusive, thence southwards to TAIMA inclusive.

South.

To include all the provinces of AZ ZADAID, AL ARIDH, AL WOSHM and AL QASIM, that is in their historical and former limits for which see John Walker's map of Arabia prepared for the Court of Directors of the East India Company, July 1849, but exclusive of al HARIQ and al KHARAJ.

East.

Exclusive of al QATIF and the as SUMMAN plain, but inclusive of HAFR AL BATIN in the Batin Wadi.

North.

Exclusive of the wells of LINA.

(b) Grazing Grounds of the Shammar.

The limits of the province of JEBEL Shammar as shown in John Walkers map (see above).


The Northern Shammar from Iraq have lines of migration (crossing Anaiza grazing grounds) connecting them with their Jebel Shammar home grounds. These lines cross the Euphrates between Ramadi on the West and SAMAWA on the East.

Thence they come down inside the Jezira i.e. between the two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates from their summer grazing grounds in the Northern Jezira, that is above Bagdad but exclusive on the North of the heights of the Jebel SINJAR.

Shaikh Ajil, the present (1937) paramount Shaikh of the Northern Shammar, camps usually South West of Mosul and does not migrate into Southern Iraq or Nejd.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٩ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٤٠٠]

HISTORICAL "C". EVENTS PRIOR TO AND THE END OF THE IBN RASHID RULE AT HAIL 1921.

In the autumn of 1920 Saud ibn Rashid, the Emir of Hail, who, under the skilful guidance of successive members of the Subhan family, had emerged from the Great War unscathed and even with enhanced prestige, was suddenly swept off his throne by assassination, and succeeded by his nephew, 'Abdullah ibn Mit'ab. Sa'ud's chief adviser during the period immediately preceding his death had been 'Aqab ibn 'Ajil a leading chief of the Shammar and also the Prince's father-inlaw, who not only conducted the negotiations with the King Husain to a satisfactory conclusion, but also secured the retrocession of the Jauf district by the Sha'lan family, which had held it for the previous ten years. Outwardly all seemed well with the house of Rashid, which found some support in the pronounced sympathy of Miss Gertrude Bell and other British officials, both at Baghdad and in London, though there was no wish on the part of the British Government to jeopardise the established good relations with Ibn Sa'ud by any outward manifestation of smympathy with his rival. Inwardly, however, the affairs of Jabal Shammar were far from prosperous. In spite of some gains from the contraband trade which had been carried on during the War, the people of Hail had on the whole been ruined by the blockade, and the Shammar tribesmen found their freedom of movement considerably restricted both by the imposition of some sort of control on their former free access to the desert "ports" like Najaf and Samawa, and by the ever-present threat of Wahhabi marauders. Townsmen and tribesmen alike clamoured for the old peace and security, whose absence was naturally imputed to the Government, and a considerable section of public opinion began to form round



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٤٠ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٨٦)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٤١و] "الملف 7/٢٨٧)

- 2 -


round 'Abdullah ibn Talal, who was, in fact, the senior member of the dynasty, being a great-grandson of Talal ibn 'Abdullah. who had reigned from 1847 to 1868. An accident precipitated developments. Sa'ud had sallied out, as the Princes of Arabia are wont to do, for apicnic in the environs of Hail, and with him went the elite of the town, including 'Abdullah and the other princes of the royal house. In the course of an impromptu shooting match, the ruling Prince had presumed to rally his cousin on his lack of skill as a marksman; and 'Abdullah's next mark was his sovereign's head. He missed not, but he was himself immediately cut down by Sa'ud's slaves. and the throne of Hail passed to 'Abdullah ibn Mit'ab, who, in the interests of his own security, threw the assassin's brother, Muhammad, into the castle dungeon. The aim of the reformers had gone awry, and Hail, instead of having a strong and capable monarch, was again the prey of a weak regime. Meanwhile Ibn Sa'ud was watching the situation from the south, and there were not wanting well-meaning citizens of Hail who sent messages to him encouraging him to come and put an end to their intolerable situation.

He himself was perhaps actuated by other motives, and political developments in 'Iraq had as much to do with the speeding up of operations against Hail as the desire to eliminate Ibn Rashid. Sharifian encouragement of the latter could be safely ignored so long as it emanated from Mecca, but the situation began to look more serious when British policy was seen to be trending in the direction of the establishment of a Sharifian regime also in Iraq. With support on both flanks and British goodwill in the background, Hail might well become once more a serious danger to Wahhabi interests. Ibn Sa'ud hesitated no longer. His troops, under his brother Muhammad, moved up into the north, while the Ikhwan levies, under Faisal al Duwish, operated in the

(141)



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٤١ ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٨٨)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٤١و] "الملف 7/٢٨٩)

- 3 -


in the eastern desert, and Nuri Sha'lan supported the movement with pressure on Jauf and the northern districts. These movements were launched during the spring of 1921, by which time the Conference convened at Cairo by Mr. Winston Churchill, who had now become responsible for the fate of the British mandated territories as Secretary of State for the Colonies. had definitely decided that Faisal, the third son of King Husain, should proceed to 'Iraq as a candidate for its throne with all the backing of the British Government. In April the only serious obstacle in the path of such a policy was removed by Sir Percy Cox's summary deportation of Saiyid Talib al Naqib, who was at this time Minister of the Interior in the provisional Government set up by Sir Percy Cox in October 1920, after the rebellion. And in June Faisal duly arrived at Basra in a British transport, while the socalled plebiscite to ascertain the views of the people of Iraq shortly afterwards confirmed Mr. Churchill's view that Faisal would be an ideal King for the mandated territory.

Now Faisal was already flirting with the Shammar, who during these few months had been drifting down from the troubled and profitless deserts of their own country to the greater peace and plenty of the Euphrates' marches, where they were not only warmly received by the king-elect, but also provided with arms, money and provisions for the maintenance of a guerilla campaign against the slowly advancing army of the Wahhabis. Faisal was doing what he could to help his father's cause and to perpetuate an effective balance of power in the desert, and, while he was not outwardly encouraged in this policy by the British authorities, his actions did not pass unnoticed by the representatives of Ibn Sa'ud at Eaghdad, who at this time were engaged in discussing with Sir Percy Cox the preliminaries of an agreement for the

4.



"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٢ ظ] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٠ او] الاملف 7/٢٩١)


- 4 -

and the two states of 'Iraq and Kuwait. Their reports made Ibn Sa'ud realise that he could no longer afford to play the tortoise in the race for Arabian hegemony; the consolidation of Faisal's position in 'Iraq might well be followed by the creation under the veiled auspices of Great Britan of an anti-Wahhabi league embracing the whole of northern Arabia above an arc joining Mecca and Basra. The position seemed to him so serious and urgent that he took the field in person in July, after the successful termination of a conference at Riyadh, in the course of which he had been acclaimed by the Wahhabi chiefs and 'Ulama as Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies. Himself remaining the Qasim, he sent forward two detachments respectively under his Brother Muhammad and his son Sa'ud to begin the siege of Hail and to harry the countryside and guard against possible attacks by the Shammar elements sojourning in 'Iraq.

Meanwhile he himself received a deputation of the citizens of Hail, and made it clear to the members thereof that he intended to press the campaign vigorously unless they were prepared to accept his sine qua non condition that the Rashid dynasty should abdicate forthwith and its members surrender their persons to him. The deputation withdrew crestfallen, and the proffered terms were refused by 'Abdullah ibn Mit'ab, but the latter was not destined to hold his throne for long. The situation in the north, where Nuri Sha'lan had seized Jauf, demanded immediate measures of relief, and in his extremity he had released from prison Muhammad ibn Talal, the brother of the slain assassin of Sa'ud, to place him at the head of a force intended for the recovery of Jauf. The latter had now returned to Hail determined to assert his right to the throne against his weak and vacillating cousin, and Abdullah, deeming discretion the better part of valour, fled to fling himself on the discretion



"الْملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٣ ظ] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٣٣ ٢/٢٩ ٢]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٤ او] الملف 7/۲۹۳)

- 5 -

discretion of the Wahhabi invader, who took him down to Riyadh, where he has sojourned in captivity to this day. Meanwhile the more vigorous Muhammad ibn Talal, being recognised as ruler of Hail, began to take the offensive against the Wahhabis, and Ibn Sa'ud once more set forth from his capital to crush the new movement before it should assume dangerous proportions. Faisal al Duwish was sent forward with 2000 of his Mutair to watch the movements of the Shammar forces, which had moved out to the neighbourhood of Jithamiya and Taisiya to meet the enemy. Faisal was not in sufficient strength to launch an attack on Muhammad's superior positions, and the two armies remained facing each other until September 8th, when Ibn Saud himself arrived at Baqa'a just in time to receive the news that Muhammad had made a surprise assault on Duwish, but had been beaten after a fight of considerable severity. The Wahhabi Sultan hurried up to complete the discomfiture of the enemy, who had taken refuge in various forts of the neighbourhood; and at dawn he opened on them with his guns, while his men advanced to the assault. Muhammad ibn Talal and his bodyguard fled by way of Jabal 'Aja to Hail; and the forts surrendered after a short bombardment. The battle was over almost before it had begun, and Muhammad ibn Talal offered to submit on condition that he should remain ruler of the province under the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ud. Such a condition was unacceptable to the Wahhabi Sultan, who now made the necessary dispositions for the siege of the city, in which a considerable party was sympathetic towards him and promised to work for early surrender if he would desist for a while from bombardment, while the Shammar ruler wrote to Baghdad imploring the mediation of the British High Commissioner and of Faisal, who had been crowned King in August. Some weeks later Ibn Sa'ud,




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٤ ١ ظ] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٤ ١ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٤٠ و] الملف 7/٢٩٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٤ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢١٠] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٠١و] "الملف 7/۲۹۸)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٠١ظ] (٣٣٢/٢٩٩)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٦٠ظ] (٣٣٢/٣٠٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [١٤٨]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٨ ظ] (٣٣٢/٣٠٢)





"الملف 53/76 155 (D | II) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٩ او] (٣٣٢/٣٠٣)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤٩ اظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠١و] "الملف 7/٣٠٥)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠١ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥١ و] الملف 7/٣٠٠)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥١ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٢٥١و] "الملف 7/٣٠٩)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠ او] "الملف 73/76)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٣ ظ] الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت"






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٤ ٥ ١ و] الملف 7/٣١٣)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٤ اظ] (٣٣٢/٣١٤)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٥ او] الملف 7/٣١٥)

53/76-11
1. gedda P.L. ho. 1665/118/10, d. 9.6.33.
1. Jedda P.L. ho. 1665/115/10, 1
P.R. File? Je 3/7
1 12 17
ut
2. Kuwait Inblligence Nº 140, dy 30. b. 1933.
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ambassador, taoe., Baghdas, may copy be sent
to C.O., and q.y. India?
5.7.33
DE 965/7
12 Ne 47/504-5, dy 5.7.33 com to Co, ambuss
14. Nr 47/Svy-5, dy 5.7.33 czaw to, ambass. Daybour, and ily g. hidia.
\$ Jones Late Nº 48 of 5/7/33 to Coloniet Office. 86 - P.L. : 805-5 - 9.9 India + Juda. - P.L. : 805-5 - Kawait. Glaint This
86 } P.L 805-5 4. of smole 4 vedica.
_ lette Nº 49 Colonial office.
53 {
of (
2 11 9 12 11 11 12 11 11 12
13 3. Kuwait Intelliques No. 182 of 10/8/13.
PR. Copy way be sent to 1.0., 9. of t.
Bulled A Broghdad & Arc. Bashdas &
huser P.C. as askal in the sund
mor wept of grand in the of 16/8/33
12.837
10 Locaso fil. No. 1054-5 of 18/8/33 to 2.0. 9. of Sudia, Rayou
The state of the s




"الملف 53/76 53/76) | الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٥ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥١٠] (٣٣٢/٣١٧)






"الملف 53/76 53 (II (D 155) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٦ ظ]






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠ او] "الملف 7/٣١٩)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠ اظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٩ او] "الملف 73/76)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٠١ظ] "الملف 7/٣٢٢)

53/76.	
15500 d.o. No c/19 g 6/5/57 to P. a. lch.	h134
Letter No. C-164. d. 29-6-37 from Kuwait	18. p.
PR. May send to I of. weeks a request	
met copy may be sent to 1.6.	
1 ssues 0.0. enter No. 547-5 of 17/7/37 to hisia office.	p. 147
re h	
Correction carried out-	
Issued D.O. P.L. No. 584-8. d. 5-8-37. Lo	
India Office. \$258.	
Kuwait. 2.0. No. C-25, d. 21/1/38.	20 9.157
U.S. A copy of the Noti together with the	
our P.L. No. 548. S of 17/7/37. File?	-×- P.148-
May P. A. Kh: be in formed as 25/1	
Yes. put appolate.	
4.5. Draft- reply submitted.	27/4
	Letter No. C-164. d. 29-6.37 from Kawait. Ph. May send bo & gt. herth a request that copy may be sent to 1.0.? 155005 Do. letter No. 547-5 of 17/1/27 to thois a glice. 16h. No. 543-5 — Ry. Ast that come Kawait. Corridandum to C. 164. d. 29-6.37 from Known Correction carried out. Correction carried out. TSSUED D.O. P.L. No. 584-8. d. 5-8-37. to I udia Cypice. A copy of the Note to Sether hith the forwarding letter was sout to A.O.C. under our P.L. No. 548-8 of 17/1/37. Tile? May Ph. let. be informed as 25/1 otopic. Yes. put appointed.




"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٩ او] "الملف 73/74 (٣٣٢/٣٢٣)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [٥٩ ظ] (٣٣٢/٣٢٤)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [ii-و] (٣٣٢/٣٢٥)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76)) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [ii-ظ]





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" (١١١-و] "الملف 7/٣٢٧)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" (٣٣٢/٣٢٨)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [v-e-e] (٣٣٢/٣٢٩)






"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" (٣٣٢/٣٣٠)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [خلفي-داخلي] (٣٣٢/٣٣١)





"الملف 53/76 (II (D 155 53/76) الاستخبارات السياسية في الكويت" [خلفي] (٣٣٢/٣٣٢)

